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THE EFFECTIVENESS OF HUMAN INTELLIGENCE IN
OPERATION UPHOLD DEMOCRACY

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

MARTIN I. URQUHART, MAJ, USA
B.A., University of Georgia, Athens, Georgia, 1982

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
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MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

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
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
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ABSTRACT

THE EFFECTIVENESS OF HUMAN INTELLIGENCE IN OPERATION UPHOLD DEMOCRACY.
by MAJ Martin I. Urquhart, USA, 121 pages.

This study investigates the effectiveness of human intelligence (HUMINT) support during the critical first twenty-seven days of Operation Uphold Democracy. Beginning with the initial permissive landing of 1st Brigade, 10th Mountain Division on 19 September 1994, and concluding with the return of President Jean Bertrand Aristide on 15 October 1994, the study records the conduct of unclassified HUMINT collection and reporting operations throughout Haiti. Were HUMINT assets tasked, did they report, and did they answer the Commander's priority intelligence requirements (PIR)?

The development of HUMINT is reviewed to arrive at a comprehensive understanding of what HUMINT is, and how it is collected. HUMINT assets within CJTF-180 are identified, and their employment is compared to doctrine. Contemporaneous documents, messages, operational logs, and other unit operational documents are examined to identify and record the instances of HUMINT collection and reporting operations for the twenty-seven day period.

The study concludes that HUMINT assets were appropriately tasked, they reported voluminously, and the information resulting from HUMINT collection and reporting effectively answered the commander's PIR.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

This thesis concerns that aspect of military intelligence (MI) known as human intelligence (HUMINT), and its role in supporting operations other than war (OOTW). Specifically, this thesis will attempt to answer the following question: Was HUMINT effective in support of Operation Uphold Democracy?

Background

Operation Uphold Democracy was executed less than one year ago by a combination of US forces formed specifically for that mission. Designated as Joint Task Force 180 (JTF-180), those forces included a wide range of units, including diverse MI Units with varied capabilities. Some of those Military Intelligence units provided HUMINT specific capabilities (such as the Interrogators assigned to the 10th Mountain Division), while all of the forces assigned to JTF-180 were capable of obtaining information from human sources (HUMINT) (such as would occur with a military policeman talking to a local national). Distinguishing between HUMINT as a capability and HUMINT as a source is essential to determining whether HUMINT was effective in Operation Uphold Democracy. The answer to the question begins with an understanding of the background of both HUMINT and Operation Uphold Democracy.

Human Intelligence

The MI branch generally comprises intelligence collection capabilities which fall into one of four broad categories: Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), Imagery Intelligence (IMINT), Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT), and HUMINT. All four disciplines are recognized for their applicability on the modern battlefield. In recent years, the US Army has begun to focus and apply these disciplines in OOTW. Key to this thesis is understanding that HUMINT is often cited for its support to OOTW; the term HUMINT gives rise to several definitions; and, those definitions of HUMINT are further delimited by the terms strategic, operational, and tactical.

In doctrinal and scholarly publications, HUMINT is singled out as the particular intelligence discipline which best supports OOTW. Field Manual (FM) 34-7, Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Support to Low-Intensity Conflict Operations, describes HUMINT as "potentially the most important and productive intelligence discipline,"¹ and FM 100-7, Decisive Force: The Army in Theater Operations, states that "most activities in MOOTW are Humint intensive."² In reviewing the relative worth of HUMINT in a prior OOTW, Major Martin N. Stanton claimed that: "Intelligence gathering in Somalia was based almost exclusively on human intelligence: information provided voluntarily by Somalis or through interrogation of captured bandits or gunmen by counterintelligence (CI) personnel."³ The Joint Task Force (JTF) Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations states that "Human Intelligence will be critical to your operations (and) the primary source of intelligence in peace operations is HUMINT."⁴ In summarizing the worth of HUMINT in operations other

than war, researchers at the Naval Post Graduate School wrote "HUMINT may be the only effective means of intelligence gathering."⁵

Unfortunately, the term HUMINT is subject to misuse and misunderstanding because the term is both a description of a source of information and a name for a methodology employed to obtain information. In defining the term HUMINT, a common understanding exists with respect to HUMINT as a source of information. All of the individual services address, and Joint Publications specifically define, HUMINT as "A category of intelligence derived from information collected and provided by human sources."⁶ There the commonality stops, for each service has a differing view and description of HUMINT as a methodology. Joint Publication 2-0 discusses HUMINT as a national capability, omitting reference to deployed troops, such as military police and interrogators.⁷ Air Force manuals⁸ seem to echo the joint perspective, but Army⁹ and Naval¹⁰ references are clear in their position that HUMINT methodology, as conducted by organically assigned and deployed units and personnel, is critical to the deployed commander. Using the Army and Naval definitions to resolve that HUMINT methodology is employed by units and personnel normally assigned to tactical organizations, the issue remains concerning which units and personnel conduct those HUMINT operations. US Army FM 34-7 provides a description of HUMINT activities and actors which may best define HUMINT for the purposes of this thesis: "HUMINT activities vary from controlled operations, liaison, interrogations, and document exploitation to debriefing of reconnaissance patrols."¹¹ Further, FM 34-7 lists several examples of HUMINT collectors, including military police, civil affairs

psychological operations, long range surveillance and interrogation personnel, and specifically includes personnel engaged in routine reconnaissance, patrolling and observation post duties.¹²

Where FM 34-7 provides an apparently useful definition of HUMINT, it contributes to the continued misunderstanding of the term when it categorizes HUMINT in relation to the levels of war.¹³ Use of the modifying terms strategic, operational, and tactical compounds the confusion concerning HUMINT. Intelligence doctrine at the joint and service level addresses intelligence support to the three established levels of war: strategic, operational, and tactical.¹⁴ Using that doctrinal approach, strategic HUMINT would support the formation of national strategy, operational HUMINT the planning and executing of major campaigns, and tactical HUMINT the execution of battles and engagements. In spite of that attempt to clarify intelligence support by the levels of war, FM 34-1 goes on to state that: "The levels of intelligence are not tied to specific echelons but rather to the intended outcome of the operation which they support."¹⁵ Other doctrinal publications echoed that concept. TRADOC PAM 525-56 specifically addresses OOTW when it states "operating elements at the lowest levels will often require strategic intelligence while national level users will require tactical intelligence."¹⁶ Taken together, these differing views serve to further confuse the definition of HUMINT.

To accomplish the aims of this research project, HUMINT must be clearly defined, and the HUMINT capabilities available to the Commander of JTF-180 must be identified. This definition and identification of HUMINT assets and capabilities will permit one to discern whether those

capabilities were employed as such and to gauge their effectiveness to Operation Uphold Democracy.

Operation Uphold Democracy

Operation Uphold Democracy is the umbrella term referring to the military aspect of the US government's intervention into Haitian affairs, which resulted in President Jean Bertrand Aristide's resumption of power on 15 October 1994. This was not the first instance of US involvement in Haitian affairs. The nation of Haiti had been embroiled in the throes of economic and military turmoil almost since its "discovery" in 1492. In this century, US Marines were first temporarily dispatched to Haiti in 1914; in July 1915, the Marine Corps committed itself to Haiti, with the mission to restore public order. Those forces left Haiti nineteen years later, after witnessing two civil wars between competing factions within the country. In 1993 the US (and Canada, under United Nations auspices) again attempted to dispatch troops to Haiti, but their landing ship, the USS Harlan County, was not permitted to dock. Economic conditions in the country, worldwide attention, United Nations (UN) resolutions and US public sentiment coalesced and resulted in President Clinton's order to plan an invasion of Haiti and to restore exiled leader Jean Bertrand Aristide to his rightful position as the first and only freely elected President of Haiti. The operation was code named Operation Uphold Democracy (OUD).

On 18 September 1994, the President signed the order authorizing the execution of Operation Uphold Democracy, and combat troops of the US Army's 82nd Airborne Division deployed from Fort Bragg, North Carolina.

Eleventh hour diplomatic and political maneuvering by an ad hoc negotiating team including former President Jimmy Carter, Senator Sam Nunn, and former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell, convinced de facto Haitian leader Lieutenant General Raul Cedras to permit President Aristide's rightful return to power, thereby preventing armed conflict. The Commander in Chief US Atlantic Command (CINCUSACOM) ordered the combat troops to return to Fort Bragg and ordered the 10th Mountain Division to conduct "unopposed" air landings in Port au Prince. What ensued was a military mission correctly classified as an OOTW. Initially planned as a forced-entry operation, characterized by combat, Operation Uphold Democracy (OUD) became an "operation other than war," characterized by peace enforcement operations. Much has been written in the aftermath about OUD. To date, no assessment of HUMINT operations in OUD has been written, although much raw data in the form of after-action reviews, interviews, and lessons learned have been compiled.

Scope

To answer the basic research question, and the inherent sub-questions, the scope of this research project will include a review of doctrine, a review of the operational activities of JTF-180 forces for a twenty-seven day period which ended with Aristide's resumption of power on 15 October 1994, and a comparative analysis of the doctrinal versus the actual employment of HUMINT capabilities during the operation. The project will conclude by determining whether HUMINT effectively

supported Operation Uphold Democracy, thereby answering the primary research question.

Importance

Research which seeks to answer the questions listed above is important because of the ever changing structure, focus, and missions of the Army. Decision makers must have valid facts and data in order to make the best decisions regarding, among other things, the future strength, capabilities, and actions of the Army. This research project will help future decision makers to correctly apply or modify doctrinal HUMINT support in OOTW. In addition, this project may reveal doctrinal or operational shortfalls in the employment of HUMINT and may give rise to new tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) for HUMINT employment. Finally, the importance of this project is underscored by the recent activation of the Defense HUMINT Service (DHS), in Clarendon, Virginia. The DHS, in effect, has removed all "strategic" level HUMINT collectors and units from the control of the individual services and placed them under the control of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). The creation of the DHS effectively reduced the quantity of HUMINT specific collectors who will be available for training and deployment as part of any future contingency operation. In that light, it is imperative that future contingencies make appropriate use of the limited assets available; understanding which assets are available and how to use them is the first step.

Primary Research Question

The background and situation as described above lead to the following primary research question: Was HUMINT effective in support of Operation Uphold Democracy? As indicated, the utility of this project lies in an accurate definition of the term HUMINT and then of an evaluation of whether HUMINT assets deployed in support of JTF-180 were used effectively. Some of the principal subordinate questions which must be addressed in this project include questions of doctrine, capabilities, and operations.

Doctrine: What is HUMINT, and which units or forces perform that function? What is the correct application of HUMINT in support of OOTW? How is HUMINT incorporated into the overall unit collection management function? How are HUMINT missions tasked? How do units performing HUMINT missions report the information they obtain?

Capabilities: Based on his assigned forces, what HUMINT capabilities were available to the Commander JTF-180?

Operations: What were the actual activities and accomplishments of the HUMINT assets deployed as part of Operation Uphold Democracy? What were the forces assigned to JTF-180, and which of these were assigned HUMINT missions? How and what did they report? Did their reporting answer the Commander's Priority Intelligence Requirements?

Assumptions

Central to the success of this project are several assumptions. First, that I will have access to sufficient operational information, records, logs, reports, and other data, at the UNCLASSIFIED level, with

which to accurately depict and describe Operation Uphold Democracy (as limited).

Second, I assume that a delineation of HUMINT collectors and activity by their relationship to the deployed warfighter is a useful and appropriate delineation. My assumption is based on the recent reorganization of Service HUMINT as directed by the Secretary of Defense Perry and on the resulting loss of missions, billets, and functions within the various service departments.

Third, I assume that the assessment criteria selected are valid and can be useful in gauging the effectiveness of any future HUMINT support to contingency operations.

Finally, I assume that my delimitation of the research model to the first twenty-seven days of Operation Uphold Democracy is appropriate to the project, and will be useful to future contingency planners. I selected this period because the operational activity, and the supporting HUMINT activities, were all clearly focused on Aristide's return to Haiti. Prior to 19 September 1994, JTF-180 forces were planning for a forced-entry, combat mission--a mission which was not executed. After 15 October 1994, JTF-180's mission was much more nebulous and did not offer any clearly definable goal, such as Aristide's return to Haiti.

Key Terminology Defined

A specific task in this project is to satisfactorily define HUMINT, and other intelligence related terminology; an implied task is to define and delineate the various forms of OOTW. Those terms and the

others listed below require definition to assure clear understanding of this project.

Attache. Name given to any number of civilian "associates" of the military regime in Haiti.¹⁷

Collection Management. The set of procedures that orchestrate the Intelligence System of Systems to focus intelligence in support of warfighting and operations other than war.¹⁸

Counterintelligence (CI). Those activities which are concerned with identifying and counter-acting the threat to security posed by hostile intelligence services or organizations, or by individuals engaged in espionage, sabotage, subversion or terrorism.¹⁹

Force Armee du Haiti (FAd'H). The Haitian Armed Forces.

Front for the Progress and Advancement of Haiti (FRAPH). A paramilitary organization allied with the Cedras Regime.²⁰

Human Resources Intelligence. The intelligence information derived from the intelligence collection discipline that uses human beings as both sources and collectors, and where the human being is the primary collection instrument.²¹

HUMINT. Human intelligence; a category of intelligence derived from information collected and provided by human sources.²²

Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB). The systematic, continuous process of analyzing the threat and environment in a specific geographic area. IPB is designed to support the staff estimate and military decision making process. Most military intelligence requirements are generated as a result of the IPB process and its interrelation with the decision making process.²³

Joint Intelligence Center (JIC). The intelligence center of the joint force headquarters. The JIC is responsible for providing and producing the intelligence required to support the joint force commander and staff, components, task forces and elements, and the national intelligence community.²⁴

Lavalas Party. The name given to the political movement which supported the candidacy and Presidency of Jean Bertrand Aristide. Creole for avalanche.²⁵

Operations Other than War (OOTW). Military activities during peacetime and conflict that do not necessarily involve armed clashes between two organized forces.²⁶

Peacekeeping. Military or paramilitary operations that are undertaken with the consent of all major belligerents; designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an existing truce and support diplomatic efforts to reach long-term political settlement.²⁷

Peace Enforcement. The application of military force, or the threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order.²⁸

Peace Operations. According to FM 100-23, an umbrella term that encompasses three types of activities; activities with predominantly diplomatic lead (preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, and peace building) and two complementary, predominantly military, activities (peacekeeping and peace-enforcement).²⁹

Priority Intelligence Requirement (PIR). An intelligence requirement associated with a decision that will affect the overall success of the command's mission.³⁰

Reconnaissance. A mission undertaken to obtain, by visual observation or other detection methods, information about the activities and resources of an enemy or potential enemy.³¹

Surveillance. The systematic observation of aerospace, surface or subsurface areas, places, persons, or things, by visual, aural, electronic, photographic, or other means.³²

Ton Ton Makouts. A militia force conceived by the political regime of Former President "Papa Doc" Duvalier, thought to number 22,000 in strength at the time of the coup which ousted "Baby Doc" Duvalier in 1986.³³

Anticipated Problems

The recency of Operation Uphold Democracy both caused some problems and solved others. Initially, I anticipated problems with acquiring unclassified documentation with which to conduct the research. My initial search revealed that much of the relevant data, such as operations plans (OPLANS), operations orders (OPORDs), and Intelligence reports, remained classified. A potential solution to the problem was to contact the appropriate classification authority, and to request authorization to downgrade selected classified material. The time constraints of this project compelled me to search more diligently for unclassified research data, and the search was successful. While classified data was reviewed to provide clarification and background

information, all data cited within the project was unclassified information.

A separate potential problem was the lack of published confirmatory information regarding the operation with which to verify data. This problem was solved through the conduct of personal interviews, obtaining relevant information from the actual participants in the operations and using the contemporaneous accounts of activities as reported in the news.

In spite of the problematic setting for the research project--the recency of Operation Uphold Democracy and its attendant classification issues--the research lead to a substantial amount of information which is reviewed in the following chapter.

Endnotes

¹U.S. Army, FM 34-7, Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Support to Low-Intensity Conflict Operations (Washington: Department of the Army, 1993), 8-1.

²U.S. Army, FM 100-7, Decisive Force: The Army in Theater Operations, (Washington: Department of the Army, 1995), 8-5.

³Martin N. Stanton, "Task Force 2-87: Lessons from Restore Hope," Military Review 74 (September 1994): 41.

⁴Department of Defense, Joint Warfighting Center, JTF Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations (Langley, VA: Joint Warfighting Center, 1995), 23.

⁵James J. Tritton, ed., Non-traditional Forms of Intelligence (Monterey, CA: Naval Post Graduate School, 1993), 58.

⁶Department of Defense, Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terminology, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1994), 174.

⁷Department of Defense, Joint Publication 2-0, Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations (Washington: GPO, 1995), IV-7. In this section, the need to establish early intelligence capabilities in a denied area clearly bespeaks of a national capability, and not the capabilities organic to a unit such as the 10th Mountain Division or the 82nd Airborne Division.

⁸Department of the Air Force, AFR 28-3, Warplanning, USAF Operational Planning Process (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1986), 184.

⁹FM 34-7, 8-1.

¹⁰Department of the Navy, Naval Doctrine Publication 2, Naval Intelligence (Norfolk: Naval Doctrine Command, 1994), 56-58.

¹¹FM 34-7, 8-1. ¹²Ibid., 8-2. ¹³Ibid., 5-2.

¹⁴FM 34-7 provides a thorough overview of this concept, as does Joint Pub 2-0.

¹⁵U.S. Army, FM 34-1, Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations (Washington: Department of the Army, 1994), 2-2.

¹⁶U.S. Army, Training and Doctrine Command, Planners' Guide For Military Operations Other Than War (Fort Monroe, VA: TRADOC, 1993), 7-8.

¹⁷George A. Fauriol, "The Military and Politics in Haiti", Haitian Frustrations: Dilemmas for U.S. Policy (n.p.) 15-29.

¹⁸U.S. Army, FM 34-2, Collection Management and Synchronization Planning (Washington: Department of the Army, 1994), 1-1.

¹⁹JP 1-02, 96.

²²U.S. Army, Operation Uphold Democracy Initial Impressions, Volume 1 (Leavenworth: Center For Army Lessons Learned, 1994), xix.

²³JP 1-02, 174. ²²Ibid.

²³U.S. Army, FM 34-130, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (Washington: Department of the Army, 1994), G-7.

²⁴JP 1-02, 203.

²⁵William W. Mendel, "The Haiti Contingency," Military Review 1 (January 1994): 50.

²⁶U.S. Army, FM 100-5, Operations (Washington: Department of the Army, 1993), G-6.

²⁷U.S. Army, FM 100-23, Peace Operations (Washington: Department of the Army, 1994), 112.

²⁸Ibid., 111. ²⁹Ibid.

³⁰FM 34-2, G-6.

³¹JP 1-02, 316.

³²Ibid., 370.

³³Mendel, "The Haiti Contingency," 51.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

There exist several publications which impact on the research questions. Those publications include doctrine (Joint and all Services); operational documents (JTF-180, ACOM, and JTF-190); Interviews; press accounts (CNN and major wire services); scholarly works on related subjects (MMAS theses, SAMS monographs, Army and Navy War College papers); and, books, magazines, and periodicals.

Doctrine

To understand and develop a clear picture of the true nature of Operation Uphold Democracy, I relied upon several doctrinal publications: FM 100-5, Operations, provided the foundation for Operations Other Than War (OOTW) specifically addressing the aspects of peacekeeping and peace enforcement. FM 100-23, Peace Operations, provided a comprehensive overview of the full range of peace operations, including support to diplomacy, peacekeeping, and peace enforcement, and served to clarify intelligence requirements to support these operations. Joint Publication 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, provided a joint level understanding of OOTW and clarified the delineation between the three forms of Peace Operations.

In researching the application of HUMINT in OOTW I found several doctrinal publications to be instructive: FM 34-1, Intelligence and

Electronic Warfare Operations, described HUMINT support to the full range of military operations including OOTW, and FM 34-2, Collection Management, described the integration of HUMINT reporting into the overall Intelligence effort. FM 34-52, Intelligence Interrogation, provided an in-depth understanding of how interrogation, as a HUMINT subdiscipline, supports OOTW. FM 34-60, Counterintelligence, described CI support to all military operations, and specifically was used to understand Screening, Cordon, and Search Operations.

Operational Documents

Included in this category were a wide range of original, facsimile, and digitized documents including OPLANs and OPORDs, situation reports (SITREPs) and fragmentary orders (FRAGOs), PIR, and CDRs' Update Briefing Slides, graphic operational overlays and intelligence reports. Much of the data was classified information; however, there existed a sufficient amount of data at the unclassified level to adequately research and answer the questions posed in this thesis.

To record the daily events in the Haiti area of operations I used the CJTF 180 Significant Activities Log, the CJTF 180 Operational Log, and the CJTF 185 (USS MT WHITNEY) Battle Watch Log. These documents provided significant insights, as well as specific examples of HUMINT reporting, for the daily evolution of Operation Uphold Democracy.

To record the execution of OPLAN 2380 and gather specific information about troop strengths, locations, missions, and plans as well as the Commander's priority intelligence requirements and

Commanders's critical information requirements (CCIR), I reviewed the CJTF 180 Commander's Update (daily) Briefing slides, a JTF 190 Chronology Log, and a briefing book entitled Operations in Haiti, Planning/Preparation/Execution, August 1994 thru January 1995, produced by the Commander, 10th Mountain Division.

To gather information concerning assessments and reviews of military actions in Haiti, I used the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) produced Operation Uphold Democracy Initial Impressions series, Volumes I, II and III. These documents provided specific after-action-review (AAR) comments from the deployed forces on a wide range of subjects including HUMINT, interrogation, cordon and search, and counterintelligence operations.

Interviews

Research into the actual conduct of operations in Haiti lead me to interview two participants in OUD. As the former S3, 519th MI battalion (BN) (during OUD), Major Darryl J. Reyes provided an in-depth, detailed review of the actual conduct of HUMINT collection operations during OUD. Another OUD participant, Major Thomas M. Smith, provided a similar review from the perspective of an intelligence officer deployed with the 110th MI BN. Additionally, I reviewed the interviews previously conducted by the CJTF 180 Command Historian. Those interviews revealed several instances where HUMINT was cited as a factor in the success of OUD.

Press accounts

The long lead time preceding the execution of Operation Uphold Democracy served as ample warning for the major wire services and the Cable News Network (CNN). Their accounts of the daily actions in Haiti provided confirmatory information regarding the evolution of OUD. In several instances, CNN reporting was the primary source of information for the research and, as it turns out, for the CJTF 190.

Related Scholarly Works

Several scholarly works exist which affect the problem. Master of Military Art and Science (MMAS) Theses and School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) monographs discuss the acquisition of tactical intelligence by HUMINT capable forces; SAMS monographs point out the disparity in peace operations terminology, and tactical intelligence limitations; and, War College papers highlight the distinctions between strategic, operational and tactical HUMINT and CI.

Research into the definition of HUMINT lead me to review Combat Engineers--A Neglected Reconnaissance Asset?, a SAMS monograph; Light Division Cavalry and Low-Intensity Conflict Reconnaissance, a SAMS monograph; Force Protection as a Battlefield Operating System, a SAMS monograph; and The Intelligence and Reconnaissance Platoon, 1935-1965: Lost in Time, an MMAS Thesis; all of which supported an argument that HUMINT is collected by forces other than those assigned to military intelligence units.

Research into HUMINT support for OOTW lead me to two scholarly works. The Function of Human Intelligence for Low-Intensity Conflict

(LIC), an Army War College (AWC) individual study project, which argued that HUMINT was key to successful LIC operations, and Mission Complete?: Tactical Intelligence during the Transition from War to Peace, a SAMS monograph, which supported the primacy of HUMINT in support of LIC.

In researching the terminology associated with OOTW, I turned to Peacekeeping and FM 100-5: Do They Match?, a SAMS monograph, which discussed peacekeeping as an effort which could include hostilities. Campaign Planning for Peace Enforcement Operations, another SAMS monograph, thoroughly examined and clarified the terminology associated with OOTW.

Books, Magazines, and Periodicals

In these media categories I found several references which provided a background in Intelligence in general and HUMINT in particular; others discussed the categorization and classification of OOTW as peacekeeping, peacemaking and peace enforcement operations; still others addressed various aspects of Operation Uphold Democracy specifically.

Books

The Military Intelligence Community provided an overview of the HUMINT capabilities of the US Government, and helped to define the historical context of HUMINT as an intelligence discipline.

Intelligence: the Challenge of the Century further defined the role of HUMINT at the strategic level and provided additional insights into the historical development of HUMINT. For specific references to the impact of Intelligence on actual operations, I turned to Leaders and

Intelligence. In Peace Support Operations and the U.S. Military I found several essays which recognized and addressed the lack of common peace operations terminology, as well as information concerning US military participation OOTW.

In researching the role of HUMINT with respect to the levels of war I reviewed Combat Intelligence in Modern Warfare, which made a strong case for the utility of HUMINT in tactical scenarios.

Magazines

The research lead me to discover several instances of journalistic writings which bore directly on intelligence support to Operation Uphold Democracy directly, others which affected my understanding of intelligence and HUMINT in general, and still others which discussed various aspects of OOTW.

Beginning with a review of the Atlantic Command (ACOM) perspective on OUD, I found Joint Intelligence and UPHOLD DEMOCRACY to be instrumental in deciphering the interrelationships between the various joint task forces employed in this operation. Building a Symbiotic Relationship and JTF JIC Operations: "Critical Success Factors" provided an understanding of the cooperative effort between USACOM and XVIII ABN Corps in providing intelligence support to OUD, while XVIII Airborne CMISE Support in Haiti explained the initial HUMINT effort in support of OUD. Researching specific HUMINT support during the conduct of OUD lead me to Targeting During Operations UPHOLD and MAINTAIN DEMOCRACY, in which I found specific information regarding the use and effectiveness of HUMINT to tactical operations during OUD. In

Marine Historian Records 'Uphold Democracy' in Haiti, I found further specific examples of how HUMINT information was critical to the Navy and Marine Corps, in their early successful stages of Operation Uphold Democracy.

In gathering specific information regarding HUMINT support to the three levels of war I reviewed HUMINT and the Operational Level of War, which provided an understanding of HUMINT's utility at echelons-above-corps (EAC), while OPERATION CONTINUE HOPE: Maintaining Intelligence Credibility described the necessity to correctly report tactical HUMINT information. In Task Force 2-87 Lessons from RESTORE HOPE, I found specific examples of the effectiveness of HUMINT, both by MI and non-MI reporters, in tactical scenarios. Division Ready Brigade IEW: Don't Leave Home Without It explained a unique aspect of HUMINT in which Army forces compliment USMC forces in conducting intelligence operations, especially HUMINT operations.

Research in the area of OOTW, specifically to understand the differences between the various peace operations, lead me to Creating a Peace To Keep, Ethnic Civil Wars Require Non-UN Peace Enforcers, which argued that peace keeping and peace enforcing troops are not interchangeable. In The Need for Criteria in UN Peace Operations I found further evidence suggesting the need for a clear distinction between peace keeping and peace enforcement operations prior to commitment by U.S. military forces. The Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) Newsletter, Operations Other Than War, Volume IV, Peace Operations, highlighted the requirement for different training and

preparations when engaged in peace keeping or peace enforcement operations.

Finally, to gain an understanding of the Haitian environment I turned to The Haiti Contingency which provided an understanding of the context in which Operation Uphold Democracy occurred.

Utility to this Project

Without the raw operational logs, reports, briefing charts and interim AAR documentation, this project would not have been possible. Further, the interviews, press accounts, books, magazines and related scholarly works were all important to an objective analysis and evaluation of whether HUMINT effectively supported OUD.

In comparing the relative utility of available literature on this subject, the personal interviews seem to have been most instructive. While all of the cited works influenced my final conclusions and recommendations, the interviews alone clarified the overarching importance of HUMINT to OUD. In the interviews, I discovered a clear expectation of, and reliance upon, HUMINT to effectively support Operation Uphold Democracy.

Research Methodology

To complete this research project, I initiated a four part plan as follows: Part one consisted of a review of doctrine, scholarly works, and operational documentation to define HUMINT and determine the full range of HUMINT capabilities which were available to JTF-180. Part Two was concerned with the accurate recording of the operational dispositions and activities of troops on the ground, specifically those

identified as capable of performing a HUMINT mission in part one above. Part three was a comparative analysis of part one's "capabilities" and part two's "operations," and sought to quantify and determine the "effectiveness" of HUMINT in OUD. Finally, part four consisted of a analysis of the information gathered in parts one through three, and sought to answer the primary research question.

Part One

The broad questions were: What is HUMINT and how should it have been employed to support OUD? What were the HUMINT capabilities doctrinally assigned to forces under the command and control of JTF-180?

Part Two

The broad questions were: What were the military operations conducted in Haiti, by JTF-180, during the period 19 September through 15 October 1994? And, what were the HUMINT activities which supported the mission?

Part Three

The specific question was: Was HUMINT effective in support of Operation Uphold Democracy. To answer that question, I assessed the actions of CJTF-180 against three criteria. First, was the available HUMINT capability TASKED. Second, did the available HUMINT force REPORT. And, third, did the reported information answer a valid Priority Intelligence Requirement (PIR).

Part Four

Successful completion of this part required completion of all preceding steps in the research design. First I made preliminary conclusions based on an effectiveness matrix. Initially, an assessment of "effective" only resulted if the HUMINT collector succeeded in all three criteria. Second, I modified those initial conclusions, as necessary, based on actual accomplishments in the area of operations. For example, a HUMINT collector may not have been tasked, thereby failing to achieve "effectiveness". If, however, that same HUMINT collector reported initiative HUMINT information which satisfied a Commander's PIR, then the criteria was regraded as "effective". Using this methodology, I "weighted" the PIR criterion to reflect its overall importance. The true utility of HUMINT, as well as all other forms of intelligence, rests not in its form, but in its function. HUMINT's function is to answer the Commander's PIR.

In concluding Part Four, I answered the primary research question, which asked: Was HUMINT effective in support of Operation Uphold Democracy?

Finally, my research determined that HUMINT was effective in support of Operation Uphold Democracy. I have attempted to pinpoint the salient success factors of that effectiveness, and to offer recommendations in the area of doctrine or TTP to help assure future successful HUMINT support to OOTW.

CHAPTER 3

DEFINING HUMAN INTELLIGENCE

What emerged from a considered study of the term HUMINT, and its development in the US Army, lead to a definition that is more general than specific. HUMINT is best defined as a category of intelligence which describes all information and methods collected from or by human sources, recognizing that "combat soldiers are the most active and reliable HUMINT collectors."¹ Restricting the definition of HUMINT to the Military Intelligence Corps alone would forgo the obvious and widespread capabilities of other troops in the field. This definition of HUMINT is borne out through a brief review of the history of military intelligence in general and HUMINT in particular.

HUMINT, as a means of both collecting and reporting intelligence information, dates back to the dawn of mankind. Man's struggle for survival surely prompted him to be wary of and observe the actions of his potential enemies. As civilizations emerged, man's individual need for information concerning his enemy was subsumed into the collective needs of society for its protection. It follows, then, that HUMINT is indelibly linked to warfare, and "one cannot speak of intelligence in the past without making reference to the battlefield, and military struggles."² In the Bible, Moses is credited with dispatching men to "spy the land" of the Canaanites;³ Delilah's dalliance with Sampson was also a HUMINT mission, one in which she was offered 1,100 pieces of

silver to discover the source of Sampson's strength.⁴ In the fifteenth century B.C., Chinese rulers relied upon "a genuine network of spies responsible for preventing conspiracies, by means of infiltration and observation;"⁵ ten centuries later, the works of Sun Tzu were bound together by admonitions and exhortations on the efficacy of intelligence in military operations.⁶ Two thousand years before Christ, in what is reported to be the earliest recorded intelligence information report, the commander of a desert patrol recorded his observations of the enemy's activities and his intent to investigate further; in that report, written in clay and discovered by the Euphrates River, the patrol commander recommended that "the guards on the city walls should be strengthened."⁷ More than anecdotal, these ancient instances of intelligence gathering, technologically restricted to HUMINT, were instrumental in the conduct of military operations.

As the centuries passed, military intelligence began to attain a place of importance in the administration of nations. In England, during the reign of Elizabeth I, military intelligence became officially recognized through the appointment of scoutmasters, whose tasks were "to search and view, that there be no enemies laid privily for annoyance."⁸ Military "intelligencers"⁹ were important to the successful administration of power throughout Europe, influencing the military accomplishments of English, French, and German rulers alike. John Churchill, the first Duke of Marlboro, developed an intelligence apparatus after his loss at Sedgemoor which was so effective that he "never lost a battle and never failed to take a town he besieged."¹⁰ In France, Louis XV entrusted command of the French armies to Hermann-

Maurice, Count de Saxe, who is credited with stating, "You cannot give too much attention to spies and guides . . . they are like eyes, equally necessary to a general."¹¹ At Rossbach in 1757 Frederick the Great attributed his success over the French, in part, to "a hundred spies"¹² who preceded him in battle.

In colonial America, future US military intelligence organizations first began to take shape during the American Revolution; all were formed on the core discipline of HUMINT. General George Washington is credited with having been "intelligence-conscious";¹³ in 1777 he established an intelligence organization with the express mission to "penetrate the headquarters of General Sir William Howe, and concentrate on General Sir Henry Clinton's military base at New York."¹⁴ This organization, although established under the control of a cavalryman of the Connecticut based Sheldon's Dragoons¹⁵, was primarily a civilian organization.¹⁶ In 1846, Generals Zachary Taylor and Winfield Scott activated "Spy Companies;"¹⁷ these companies comprised the first US intelligence organizations designed specifically for military purposes.¹⁸

Although the United States Army had success with the Mexican War Spy Companies, they were disbanded after the war. As a result, on the eve of the Civil War the US Government had a limited intelligence capability. In spite of that slow start, both Federal and Confederate forces benefited from HUMINT sources. In 1861, a Confederate Agent obtained and reported information on the Army of the Potomac's plans to advance in to Virginia. Using that information Confederate forces were able to position their forces accordingly; the result was the Federal

defeat at the first Battle of Bull Run.¹⁹ Similarly, the Federal forces benefited from the exploits of a brave "Federal spy"²⁰ named Lafayette Baker. Working directly for General Winfield Scott, Baker roamed throughout Confederate military positions gathering intelligence information for the Federal forces. Playing upon the vanity of soldiers and officers alike, Baker was able to pose as an itinerant photographer and gather information on the location and disposition of the Confederate forces, although his camera was broken.²¹

In America's history, up through the Civil War, "Commanders relied on cavalry, scouts and reconnaissance patrols for most of their tactical intelligence."²² Throughout this time, technology largely restricted intelligence gathering to activities accomplished using one of the 5 senses: HUMINT. Military Intelligence, as a function of the US Armed Forces, languished in the years after the Civil War. By 1885, however, the requirement for intelligence resulted in the formation of the Military Information Division (MID),²³ which functioned to "collect and file information forwarded by embassies overseas and culled from foreign newspapers."²⁴ This MID was initially an organization comprised of military attaches, and their collection efforts by definition HUMINT. As an important turning point in the development of current military intelligence, the creation of the MID led to Congressional sanctioning of the military attache system in 1889, and receipt of a War Department charter by 1892.²⁵ In the Spanish-American War of 1898, an officer working for the MID, Lieutenant Andrew S. Rowan, was instrumental in gathering HUMINT for General Shafter, the US Force commander facing the

Spanish. For his efforts, Lieutenant Rowan was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross.²⁶

In 1898, a signal event in the development of military intelligence occurred with the assignment of CPT Ralph H. Van Deman to the MID. In his tenure with the MID, Van Deman is credited with having rescued the MID from a downslide to obscurity in 1915, by which time the MID had been relegated from its position as an independent department and the Second Section of the General Staff, to an office within the War College known as the Information Branch.²⁷ Van Deman assumed control of this "deteriorated"²⁸ office, and by 1917 had both rejuvenated the capabilities of the office and had lobbied successfully for its redesignation as the Military Intelligence Branch.²⁹ For his efforts, Van Deman is recognized as the "true founder of American military intelligence."³⁰

When he assumed duties on 3 May 1917 as Chief of the newly created Military Intelligence Section of the War College Division, then MAJ Van Deman had as his principal assistants four people: an active duty Army Captain, a retired Army Major, and two civilian clerks. By 11 November 1918, the departmental military intelligence agency had grown to over 1100 personnel.³¹ The growth in personnel was matched by a growth in funding, and indicated the importance of military intelligence to the War Department. That importance was underscored by the restoration of military intelligence as "a separate and coequal element of the War Department General Staff."³²

Commensurate with the growing importance and independence of the military intelligence section was the emerging definition of military

intelligence as opposed to military information, and its linkage to military operations. In December 1917, the War Department issued a special bulletin concerning the purpose of intelligence staffs at divisions and corps, which stated that these intelligence sections should have

little to do with information of our own forces. It deals almost exclusively with information on the enemy, which it collects, collates, and makes available for the use of the operations section in the latter's work of preparing the plans of operation. The intelligence section is the normal medium through which the information of the enemy is made available for the use of our forces. The responsibility of this Section is to procure and provide all available information in a form directly usable by the Operations Section. The Operations Section must in turn base its plan upon the information provided by the Intelligence Section.³³

The culmination of the efforts of Van Deman and others occurred on 26 August 1918 with the issuance of a War Department General Order which reformed the US Army General Staff into four divisions. Among those four divisions was the Military Intelligence Division,³⁴ which was chartered to "collect, collate and disseminate military intelligence," "supervise the duties of military attache's," and "translate foreign documents" among its many duties.³⁵ HUMINT, although a term not used at the time, adequately encompassed most of the activities which were to form the basis for the functions of the Military Intelligence Division.

At the outbreak of World War I, military attaches worldwide formed the critical nucleus of the US intelligence effort; in response to possible US involvement, their operations and activities, as well as their postings were approximately doubled in size.³⁶ As a result, US military forces entered the fray with a robust HUMINT capability. Tactical units provided combat intelligence "collected by observers,

scouts, reconnaissance patrols and interrogation of prisoners of war,"³⁷ and General Pershing's own intelligence officer used "agents operating behind enemy lines."³⁸ Coupled with the increase in Attaché operations was the creation of two new organizations, each with unique HUMINT capabilities: the Corps of Intelligence Police (to provide personnel to "assist in performing the overseas counterespionage mission"³⁹) and the Corps of Interpreters (to provide "competent and trustworthy interpreters for services within the AEF, France"⁴⁰). The Corps of Interpreters was disbanded immediately after the war, but the Corps of Intelligence Police remained and evolved into the Counter Intelligence Corps.⁴¹

Unlike the vast majority of the armed forces, the military intelligence division did not begin an immediate demobilization at the conclusion of World War I. Colonel Van Deman himself was charged with providing a "Contre-Espionage Service for the American Commission to Negotiate Peace."⁴² This engagement in CI actions precluded full scale demobilization of the MID for six months following the war's end,⁴³ and served to validate the need for intelligence support in a peacetime environment. But, demobilization and further decline was imminent, and in the years between 1920 and 1935, the MID was reduced from 234 personnel and a budget of \$400,000 to 75 personnel and a budget of \$35,500.⁴⁴ As in the past, the US post-war demobilization resulted in a peacetime intelligence capability which would be woefully inadequate for the next war, which loomed over the horizon.

In the mid-to-late 1930s, Americans began to wake up to the growing threat of Nazism. Beginning in 1936, the MID operated with an

authorized strength of 66 personnel and a budget of \$87,000; by 1941 those figures had expanded to 848 personnel and \$360,000.⁴⁵ While the growth in military intelligence units and functions reflected a growing technological capability, one that required a significant SIGINT capability⁴⁶, tactical army units had found a separate HUMINT solution to their quest for intelligence: the Intelligence and Reconnaissance (I&R) Platoon. With an initial authorization of 10 soldiers, the I&R Platoons served as "the human eyes and ears for the regimental commander."⁴⁷ During World War II, "every tactical infantry formation, from platoon through division, included a reconnaissance and surveillance organization."⁴⁸ As a significant aspect in the development of HUMINT, the I&R Platoon served as the fusion point between strictly military intelligence units and strictly combat arms units. Its charter reflected that fusion:

The principle mission of the regimental intelligence platoon is to serve as the special intelligence agency of the regimental commander, for the collection, recording, evaluation, and dissemination of information, under the supervision of the regimental intelligence officer (S-2). The platoon is also charged with counterintelligence measures and surveillance.⁴⁹

Close on the heels of the I&R Platoon's implementation was the MID's creation, in 1942, of a separate Military Intelligence Service (MIS). As an operating arm of the MID, MIS trained interpreters and interrogators, among other specialties, which were then "formed into specialized teams and dispatched to overseas theaters to support the intelligence staffs of the Army's combat formations."⁵⁰ Together, these specialized teams, combined with the capabilities of the tactical forces

(such as the I&S Platoon and the Alamo Scouts⁵¹) and a burgeoning MID, provided significant HUMINT support to the deployed commanders.

World War II's conclusion was not unlike all major conflicts preceding it; a robust intelligence apparatus was destined to post-war doldrums. While the tactical HUMINT mission and capabilities of the I&R Platoon remained, as well as the reconnaissance and surveillance missions assigned to other standard tactical units, the US Army military intelligence community embarked on a series of changes in organization, mission and function. These changes propelled military intelligence through the Korean War era and into the Vietnam War era before military intelligence, as a functional combat support arm, was formally organized as a separate branch in the Army in 1967.

Almost 12 years prior to the formal establishment of the Military Intelligence Branch, the Army recognized a need to separately manage the unique skills and functions associated with what it formerly called positive intelligence.⁵² Previously positive intelligence, or the proactive acquisition of intelligence from HUMINT sources, had been performed on an "ad hoc basis by the CIC."⁵³ In 1955, the Army formed the US Army Operational Detachment (USAOD), and charged that organization with the positive intelligence collection mission. USAOD, and its progeny, became the focal point for what was to be called Army HUMINT. While this organization was a specific HUMINT entity, the greater Army retained a requirement to obtain intelligence information from HUMINT, which it accomplished through its tactical forces employing, primarily, reconnaissance and surveillance techniques.

Recognizing the divergence in single and multi-discipline intelligence organizations and missions is crucial to understanding the uncertainty surrounding the use of the term HUMINT. While USAOD developed as a unique singular intelligence organization, with a decidedly nontactical orientation, the remainder of Army intelligence organizations continued to develop along tactical lines, relying upon a multidiscipline approach that eventually resulted in the Combat Electronic Warfare and Intelligence (CEWI) units organized in the late 1970s.⁵⁴

Beginning with that initial offshoot as the USAOD, positive intelligence collectors and units became increasingly specialized and regional in focus.⁵⁵ The roles and functions of the personnel and equipment initially assigned to USAOD evolved through a myriad of organizational structures and task organizations which eventually produced the US Army Foreign Intelligence Activity, in 1991. With each and every iteration of its evolution, this faction of HUMINT distanced itself farther and farther from the uniformed services.⁵⁶ In 1995, the final step in the evolution occurred with the activation of the DHS, which removed command and control of this unique HUMINT capability from the Army and placed it under the control of the Defense Intelligence Agency.⁵⁷ What initially began as an effort to formalize management and control over an intelligence effort which was "ad hoc,"⁵⁸ resulted in the removal of that capability from within the US Army.

While USAOD and its ilk specialized in HUMINT as it pertained to uniquely focused operations, conducted by uniquely trained intelligence personnel, the remainder of the Army continued to develop an

intelligence force using a methodology formed on the precept that "Intelligence is not solely the affairs of a few specialists."⁵⁹ As far back as 1940, Army doctrine required that "appropriate instructions in this subject will be given to all officers and enlisted men because every officer and enlisted man has a part to play in Military Intelligence."⁶⁰ By 1951, just three short years prior to the birth of USAOD, intelligence collectors were defined as

the organic and supporting units of division and lower units which collect information, for the most part, by actual contact with the enemy. This type comprises ground reconnaissance units, and infantry, artillery, engineers and tank units.⁶¹

In 1967, that definition was modified to state that "all units have capabilities which can be exploited for collecting information."⁶² The 1973 version of the Combat Intelligence manual fused, for the first time, the term HUMINT with the activities of intelligence collectors on battlefield.⁶³ In 1984, the US Army's Intelligence Branch capstone manual, FM 34-1, Intelligence & Electronic Warfare Operations, distilled the meaning of HUMINT as follows:

HUMINT includes all information derived through human sources. Tactically, it is represented by exploitation of enemy prisoners of war (EPW) and documents, long-range patrols, observation posts (OP), liaison with local military or paramilitary forces, and most importantly, reports from friendly troops.⁶⁴

Where FM 34-1 made the generic case for friendly troop reporting, FM 34-10 amplified that thought and stated, "Every unit in the division has an implied mission to report information about the enemy."⁶⁵ The doctrinal manual then discussed the HUMINT capabilities of all major elements of a division, including the frontline troops and reconnaissance patrols, Combat Aviation Brigade and DIVARTY ground and aerial observation

activities, as well as the visual observations of the air defense artillery (ADA) battalion, engineer (ENG) battalion, MP Company and the division support command (DISCOM).⁶⁶

In contrast to the progression of so called Army HUMINT down a path of continual canalization which eventually lead to its demise, HUMINT, as a function of uniformed forces was an integral component of the reorganization and expansion of military intelligence under the CEWI concept. Beginning in the late 1970s, the 525th MI Group⁶⁷ was assigned the mission to operate as a single integrated organization which coordinated the efforts of all intelligence disciplines to "provide an accurate assessment of the enemy on the battlefield with an integrated management system."⁶⁸ The organizational structure of the 525th MI included representation from all of the intelligence disciplines, including HUMINT specific collectors such as Interrogators and Long Range Surveillance assets. This CEWI organizational concept was implemented throughout the Army and resulted in the permanent assignment of HUMINT specific MI branch collectors down to Regiment level.

HUMINT Capability of CJTF-180

Elements and functions of CEWI units, specific combat arms units, and the population as a whole comprised the military HUMINT capability in the US Army on the eve of Operation Uphold Democracy. The task organization of Combined Joint Task Force 180 (Appendix) reveals a significant force structure with a considerable HUMINT capability.

CEWI units which deployed as part of CJTF-180 included the 525th MI Brigade (ABN) of the XVIII Corps (ABN) as well as the 110th MI Battalion of the 10th Infantry Division (LT) (MTN). Both of these units were comprised of multidisciplined intelligence units and specific HUMINT assets, including the Interrogation and Counterintelligence Companies of the 519th MI Battalion (TE) of the 525th BDE, and the Interrogation and Counterintelligence Teams of the Intelligence and Surveillance Company of the 110th MI Battalion.⁶⁹

Several combat and combat support arms units, with specific HUMINT capabilities, deployed as part of CJTF-180. Among those units were the 10th IN DIV (LT) (MTN) and 2-3 Special Forces Group (ABN), as well as a Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force (SPMAGTF) and a Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) (JTF-188).⁷⁰

The 10th IN DIV forces were comprised of Light and Mechanized Infantry forces which were capable of patrolling, reconnaissance and surveillance operations; the 2-3 SFG deployed its full compliment of ODA and ODB elements with their inherent capability to conduct special reconnaissance and intelligence collection operations, as well as patrolling, reconnaissance and surveillance functions; and the SPMAGTF deployed with a robust infantry force task organized in two Task Forces, each capable of patrolling, reconnaissance and surveillance operations, as well as an organic intelligence capability in the Surveillance Reconnaissance and Intelligence Group (SRIG).⁷¹

The JSOTF included forces from both the US Army 75th Ranger Regiment as well as the US Navy Seal Team 6. Each of these units, although highly specialized and specifically trained for unique

missions, added to the HUMINT capability of the CJTF-180, with their ability to observe and report intelligence information upon deployment.⁷²

In addition to the specific units and capabilities listed above, a full accounting of the HUMINT capability of CJTF-180 must include the various news reporting agencies and personnel, and government and non-government organizations in the country. CNN, AP, and UPI all had a robust news collection and reporting force in Haiti; the Haitian Assistance Coordination Center (HACC) was a designated collection point for information from private volunteer organizations (PVOs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs),⁷³ which served as a critical interface with government and nongovernmental agencies through collecting and reporting intelligence and operational information.⁷⁴ Finally the sheer size and potential impact of the force as a whole was significant. Twenty-seven days after landing in Haiti, CJTF-180 was comprised of military forces totaling approximately 20,000 personnel.⁷⁵ In light of the historical development of the definition of HUMINT, and the types and quantities of forces, organizations, and personnel deployed to Haiti, these military and civilian, military intelligence specific and non MI specific units comprised a significant and capable force, possessing a widespread HUMINT collection and reporting potential.

Endnotes

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¹²Haswell, 51. ¹³Ibid., 59. ¹⁴Ibid. ¹⁵Ibid.

¹⁶Haswell, 83. ¹⁷Ibid. ¹⁸Ibid. ¹⁹Ibid., 89.

²⁰Haswell, 89. ²¹Ibid.

²²John Patrick Finnegan, Military Intelligence, A Picture History (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1992), 4.

²³Haswell, 117. ²⁴Ibid., 118. ²⁵Ibid. ²⁶Ibid.

²⁷Haswell, 119. ²⁸Ibid. ²⁹Ibid., 120. ³⁰Ibid., 119.

³¹Bruce W. Bidwell, History of the Military Intelligence Division, Department of the Army General Staff: 1775-1941 (Frederick, Maryland: University Publications of America, 1986), 110.

³²Bidwell, 118.

³³War Department Bulletin 74, 31 December 1917. As listed in Bidwell, 116.

³⁴Bidwell, 117. ³⁵Ibid. ³⁶Ibid., 239.

³⁷Finnegan, 11. ³⁸Ibid.

³⁹Bidwell, 28. ⁴⁰Ibid., 128. ⁴¹Ibid., 239.

⁴²"Van Deman Hist. Memo," 10 APR 1951, App. "A," pp.1-2, as quoted in Bidwell, 247.

⁴³Bidwell, 252. ⁴⁴Ibid., 258. ⁴⁵Ibid.

⁴⁶The Army had by now implemented the Special Intelligence Service, a SIGINT based organization which proved to be the forerunner of the Army Security Agency (ASA).

⁴⁷Richard J. Runde, "The Intelligence and Reconnaissance Platoon, 1935-1965: Lost in Time" (Master of Military Art and Science Thesis, US Army Command and General Staff College, 1994), 21.

⁴⁸Runde, 20.

⁴⁹Department of the Army, FM 7-25, Headquarters Company, Intelligence and Signal Communication, Rifle Regiment (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1941), 5. As quoted in Runde, 21.

⁵⁰Finnegan, 12. ⁵¹Ibid., 96.

⁵²Bidwell, 150.

⁵³Finnegan, 130. ⁵⁴Ibid.

⁵⁵Author's personal experience.

⁵⁶In fact, the activation of USAFIA was the culmination of an effort to "stovepipe" all controlled HUMINT under one commander; in effect, all controlled HUMINT was removed from the tactical Army with the activation of the USAFIA.

⁵⁷Tony Capaccio, "New Pentagon Spy Service Conducted Operations in Haiti," Defense Week 15 (17 April 1995): 1.

⁵⁸Author's personal experience.

⁵⁹U.S. Army, FM 30-5, Combat Intelligence (Washington: Department of the Army, 1951), 35.

⁶⁰FM 30-5 (1940), 30.

⁶¹FM 30-5 (1951), 35.

⁶²FM 30-5 (1967), 47.

⁶³FM 30-5 (1973), 2-16.

⁶⁴U. S. Army, FM 34-1, Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations (Washington: Department of the Army, 1994), 2-12.

⁶⁵U. S. Army, FM 34-10, Division Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations (Washington: Department of the Army, 1986), 2-10.

⁶⁶FM 34-10, 2-0.

⁶⁷This unit was eventually designated a Brigade.

⁶⁸Richard N. Warne, "525 Military Intelligence Group (CEWI): The Eyes and Ears of the Corps Commander," Military Intelligence Magazine October-December 1980, 16.

⁶⁹CJTF-180 Task Organization (as of 9 October 1994), Caribbean Collection, Army Knowledge Network, Ft. Leavenworth, KS.

⁷⁰Ibid. ⁷¹Ibid. ⁷²Ibid.

⁷³U.S. Army 10th Mountain Division, 10th Mountain Division
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⁷⁴CJTF-180 BattleWatch Log, 302030. AKN.

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CHAPTER 4

HUMAN INTELLIGENCE EMPLOYED

Doctrine

HUMINT, like all other intelligence disciplines, exists to provide a commander with the intelligence required in time to make and execute operational decisions. Within the US Army, there exists several doctrinal manuals which address the issue of coordinating and optimizing the capabilities of intelligence collectors; the collective effort which aims to orchestrate organizations and systems to focus the overall intelligence effort is known as the collection management process.¹ US Army FM 34-2, Collection Management and Synchronization Planning, delineates a six step process for the efficient execution of the collection management functions.

In step 1, Develop Requirements, collection managers identify, prioritize, and refine uncertainties concerning the threat and the battlefield environment that a commander must understand to successfully accomplish his unit's mission.² The desired product of this step is a "prioritized list of exactly what needs to be collected, precisely where it needs to be collected, and when it needs to be collected and reported"³ to successfully support a given mission.

Step 2, Develop Collection Plan, is a process of integrating and synchronizing the capabilities of collectors which ensures that the "best collectors"⁴ are selected to address each requirement developed in the first step. An effective collection plan is one that accurately matches

the capabilities and limitations of all available collection assets to the collection requirements, and results in a collection strategy that will "produce the intelligence required to effectively answer the commander's intelligence requirements."⁵

In step 3, Task or Request Collection, collection managers implement the collection plan. Using the appropriate tasking method for that level command, collection managers task, or submit requests to, those "best" qualified collectors identified in step 2. A successfully planned and executed collection plan results in the transmittal of clearly focused collection taskings, or requests, to the collection asset which has the capability to collect the required information.⁶

Step 4, Disseminate, is the first step in the collection management process in which intelligence information is delivered to those users who requested and need the information.⁷ Effective dissemination ensures that intelligence information consumers receive intelligence in a timely manner. Dissemination of collected information should be transmitted directly from collector to consumer where possible, to facilitate the timely use of the collected information in the overall military operation. Collection managers disseminate information using the communications capabilities of the command, and may include Voice, Text and Graphics.

In step 5, Evaluate Reporting, collection managers monitor the effectiveness of the collection plan, and adjust taskings and requests as appropriate, to keep reporting "synchronized with the operation and the commander's needs."⁸ An analytical effort, this step requires collection managers to monitor the execution of the collection plan, correlate incoming information to intelligence requirements, determine whether and

when a specific requirement is satisfied, and provide concurrent feedback to intelligence collectors on the effectiveness of their collection efforts.⁹

Finally, in step 6, Update Collection Planning, collection managers adjust the collection plan to "keep intelligence synchronized and optimize collection and exploitation capability as the current situation changes."¹⁰ As the last step in a cyclical process, collection managers ensure that the collection plan remains focused on a commander's intelligence requirements, by redirecting assets away from satisfied or moot requirements, toward those that remain unanswered. If successful, the application of the six step collection management process to the total collection effort results in a continually synchronized effort, which satisfies all intelligence collection requirements.¹¹

The collection management process is applicable to all intelligence disciplines and assets, including HUMINT. While HUMINT, as previously defined, incorporates the capabilities of all available sources, the collection plan only considers uniformed HUMINT assets and capabilities. A review of the doctrinal capabilities of uniformed HUMINT assets revealed that they generally fall into two categories: Military Intelligence units, and Other units.

Military Intelligence HUMINT Capabilities

MI units, like all other units, are comprised of humans; and, humans define the capability HUMINT. Doctrinally, however, only HUMINT designated units are managed as such. In the uniformed MI community,

HUMINT is a capability of Interrogation, Long Range Surveillance, and Counterintelligence units.

As a form of HUMINT collection, "Interrogation is the process of questioning a source to obtain the maximum amount of usable information."¹¹ Sources, as defined by FM 34-52, include civilian internees, insurgents, EPWs, defectors, refugees, displaced persons, agents or suspected agents and other non-US personnel. A second principal function of interrogators is the exploitation of captured enemy documentation (CED), commonly referred to as document exploitation, or DOCEX.

The Army's Interrogation capability resides in units at echelons above corps (EAC), corps, and division levels. At EAC, interrogation companies are components of theater level MI Brigades or Groups; at corps level, interrogation companies are organic to the tactical exploitation battalion (TEB) of the MI Brigade; and at division level, interrogation teams are components of the tactical MI battalion.¹³

Depending upon the level, interrogation teams may be deployed forward with maneuver units conducting hasty tactical interrogations, or they may be employed at EPW detention facilities from division up to the joint level, conducting detailed interrogations and debriefings. In OOTW, interrogators conduct their normal EPW/CED missions, but "may also participate in cordon and search operations"¹⁴ in concert with Counterintelligence units or personnel. Typically, if interrogators are deployed in general support, they are tasked by the commander or S3 of their parent MI unit. If deployed in direct support of a maneuver unit, they are tasked by that unit commander, through his S2.¹⁵

Long Range Surveillance Units (LRSU), a second form of HUMINT, "act as the commander's eyes on target in the deep battle for prolonged periods of time."¹⁶ LRSUs combine the skills of communications specialists and infantrymen into teams which are doctrinally deployed into enemy territory to observe and report. LRSUs exist in light divisions and corps, and are doctrinally deployed to observe specific points on the ground, and provide information to "help locate, identify and track enemy forces."¹⁷ Typically, LRSUs are deployed in general support roles and receive their taskings from the commander or S3 of their parent MI battalion.

A third uniformed HUMINT capability is provided by counterintelligence (CI) personnel. The mission of CI is to detect, identify, assess, counter, neutralize, or exploit enemy intelligence collection efforts.¹⁸ As a multidisciplined intelligence function, CI provides analytical support to identifying enemy SIGINT and IMINT capabilities, but focuses on the HUMINT threat. In doing so, CI fills the role of supporting a commander's requirement to preserve essential secrecy, and protect the forces directly or indirectly.¹⁹

Similar to Interrogation, the Army CI capability resides in units at various echelons, from EAC to division, including support to SF Groups. At EAC, CI units are organic to theater level MI brigades or groups; at corps level, CI companies reside in the Tactical Exploitation Battalion (TEB); and, at division level, CI and Interrogation capabilities coexist in divisional MI battalion. At each level, CI teams conduct investigations, operations and collections in support of PIR.²⁰

Typically, a CI team is formed based on a review of mission requirements and includes a CI Warrant Officer and several NCOs from both

CI and Interrogation specialties. Doctrinally, these teams are deployed to provide "area coverage"²¹ at corps and EAC, while at division level, CI teams are assigned habitual relationships with maneuver brigades. Like interrogators, these CI teams may be forward deployed with maneuver units, or operating at any of the various EPW sites, conducting CI screening operations.

Other Military Human Intelligence Capabilities

A review of the doctrinal HUMINT capability of nonmilitary intelligence units revealed, first, that all soldiers are tasked to report information of potential intelligence value; second, that certain units, doctrinally dispersed on the battlefield possess a passive HUMINT capability; and third, that certain key units possess a HUMINT capability which is proactively managed.

The elemental requirement to report information of potential intelligence value is a requirement applied to all soldiers.²² As a Skill Level 1 task, its importance is highlighted by its listing as the first task in the Soldier's Manual of Common Tasks. The standard, or measure of success in this task, is to accurately and quickly report information as it relates to six categories of information: size, activity, location, unit, time, and equipment. The acronym SALUTE, incorporating the first letter of each of the six categories, is the designated name and format for the report which must be submitted by any soldier who obtains information of potential intelligence value, irrespective of their location or function on the battlefield.

Passive HUMINT collectors include all combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) arms units and personnel on the battlefield. At a given level, such as division or corps, collection managers recognize the visual observation capabilities of such dispersed units, and plan for their ability to observe their surroundings out to a distance of approximately 4 to 6 kilometers.²³ Depending upon the specific location of the CS or CSS unit, collection managers may task these units to observe and report on specific key terrain features; typically, however, these units are not active collectors of HUMINT.

Active HUMINT collectors normally fall into the category of combat arms (CA) units. For example, Infantry units may be tasked to conduct specific reconnaissance patrols along a designated route, in a specific area or in a specific zone.²⁴ In contrast to CS and CSS units, CA units are specifically tasked to conduct reconnaissance missions to satisfy intelligence requirements.²⁵ Aviation units conduct similar missions, providing "timely reconnaissance and intelligence"²⁶ throughout the battlefield. Aviators observe and report all information of a potential intelligence value observed on a given air mission, whether a directed collection mission or not.

A third active HUMINT collection capability resides in the Special Forces (SF) units. As one of its five primary missions, SF units conduct "special reconnaissance."²⁷ These missions are conducted to "obtain or verify by visual observation"²⁸ information required to satisfy a commander's intelligence requirements. While SF units are themselves voracious consumers of intelligence information, by definition, their doctrinal employment places them in locales and positions with access to

information which is of intelligence value.³⁰ Doctrinally, SF units report intelligence information through SF channels to the J2 of the Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF), who exchanges the information and intelligence with the J2 of the deployed Joint Task Force (JTF), at the JIC.³¹ From there, collected information is shared with forces and collections managers in conventional units.

CJTF-180

A review of the actual employment and operations of CJTF-180 revealed that HUMINT, as both a source of information, and as a collection methodology, was employed and managed in accordance with doctrine. The design of the 10th Mountain Division (JTF-190) Intelligence Collection Plan³² reflected an adherence to doctrinal intelligence collection management. The collection plan listed the Commander's Priority Intelligence Requirements, key indications (or analysis of intelligence requirements) and Specific Orders or Requests derived from those indications and PIR. In listing the available "agencies"³³ which could be tasked or requested to obtain the necessary information, the collection plan included all of the JTF-190's principal subordinate elements, including those with specific MI HUMINT capabilities, as well as those non-MI units capable of acquiring HUMINT.³⁴

Military Intelligence Human Intelligence

A review of the CJTF-180 task organization, OPLANS and operational documentation revealed that there were three separate units with military intelligence HUMINT capabilities deployed in support of OUD: the 110th MI

Battalion of the 10th MTN DIV, the MI detachment of the 3rd SFG, and the 519th MI Battalion of the 525th MI Bde/XVIII ABN Corps.

The 110th MI Battalion task organized its Intelligence and Surveillance Company, and deployed CI/IPW Teams with both the 1st and 2nd brigades of the 10th MTN DIV. As direct support (DS) units, these CI/IPW Teams were tasked by, and reported to, the individual brigades. When the 10th MTN DIV initiated its Mountain Strike Operations (a series of raids against suspected weapons cache sites), these CI/IPW Teams were integral members of each Mountain Strike company team task organization.³⁴ The remaining HUMINT element in the 10th MTN DIV was the Long Range Surveillance Detachment (LRSD), which was used primarily as an infantry force. Retained under the command and control of the 110th MI Battalion, the LRSD was assigned missions, such as guarding the Presidential Palace and participating in Mountain Strike operations.³⁵

The 3rd SFG deployed operational detachment A (ODA) and B (ODB) teams throughout Haiti, to over 27 separate locations.³⁶ The military intelligence detachment organic to the 3rd SFG dispatched its Interrogators to the Joint Detention Facility (JDF), while retaining its CI personnel under the control of the 3rd SFG.³⁷ Working alongside the 519th MI Interrogators at the JDF, the 3rd SFG interrogators assisted in a cooperative effort to provide intelligence information through the JIC to the entire CJTF-180 force, which included the 3rd SFG.

As the principal military intelligence unit in support of CJTF-180, the 525th MI Bde dispatched an advance party to Haiti on the 20th of September 1994. Formed from elements of the 519th MI Battalion (Tactical Exploitation), the advance party consisted of approximately 15 personnel

including CI, Interrogator, Linguists and others. This advance party established its initial positions at the Light Industrial Complex, approximately two miles south west of the Port au Prince airfield.³⁸

For the first 72 hours, the advance party was concerned with locating and establishing communications with the various units it would support. One of the early issues confronting 519th was the employment of its Interrogation Teams, and whether those teams would obtain intelligence from interrogations at a Joint Intelligence Center, or information from debriefings at a Joint Detainee Facility. The issue was resolved in coordination with the CJTF-180 and CJTF-190 Judge Advocate Generals (JAG), who advised that the force should establish a JDF. In implementing that advice, CJTF-190 developed and instituted thorough "rules of engagement vis-a-vis the detainees,"³⁹ including the requirement that 519th MI submit a daily status report to CJTF-190 listing the quantity and names of all detainees, and a recommendation as to whether the detainee should be retained or released.⁴⁰

After establishing, in concert with the 16th MP Bde, a JDF within the confines of the LIC, 519th interrogators began debriefing the multitude of detainees who were to pass through that facility. Interrogators from the 3rd SFG deployed to the site and assisted the 519th in the debriefing effort. CI personnel from the 519th assisted the interrogators at the JDF, conducting screening operations to identify personnel of CI interest.⁴¹

Once firmly established at the LIC, the 519th MI began to proactively pursue information from HUMINT sources. Beginning with basic information elicitation from Haitians gathered at the two gates to the LIC, CI/IPW/Linguist Teams were formed and began to conduct information

gathering patrols in progressively larger concentric circles. Eventually, these patrols ranged as far as the PAP Airfield, and the so-called Military Triad, which was defined by the National Police Headquarters, the FAd'H Headquarters and the National Palace. Armed with the current PIR, and a list of the "Top 25 Personalities"⁴² of interest to the command, these patrols were dispatched to obtain information to satisfy the commanders PIR. Using frequency modulation (FM) radios, Mobile Subscriber Radio Telephones and a specialized high frequency radio system known as the Gold Wing communications system, these patrols reported directly to the tactical operations center (TOC) established by the 519th MI Bn at the LIC. The 519th, in turn, collated, analyzed and reported the information to the CJTF-190 JIC in twice daily Intelligence Summaries (INTSUM).⁴³

Within ten days of their arrival, the 519th began to build link-diagrams and gather the names and personalia on several Haitians whose motives and actions could be at odds with those of the CJTF-180, while plotting the locations of incidents that occurred throughout the area of operations. Recognizing the tremendous and seemingly uncoordinated potential of HUMINT in satisfying the CJTF-180 commander's PIR, the 519th initiated a nightly coordination meeting, the purpose of which was to ensure that all potential HUMINT collectors were aware of the current PIR. Attendees at the meetings were Liaison Officers (LNOs) from the 3rd SFG, 110th MI Battalion, 16th MP Bde, 10th Mountain Division, the Engineer Bde, as well as other CS and CSS units. At these coordination meetings, the various LNOs were briefed on the current situation throughout the AOR, as well as the status of planned and previous HUMINT collection operations. The intent of those coordination meetings was to ensure that all available

HUMINT collectors were aware of the current requirements, to ensure that communications were firmly established between those HUMINT sources and the 519th MI TOC, and to benefit from the mutual exchange of information acquired from all available HUMINT sources. Additionally, this meeting facilitated the coordination of logistical, personnel and vehicular support requirements for each planned mission. In effect, the 519th established itself as a clearinghouse for HUMINT operations and information.⁴⁴

Moreover, the coordination meetings served as a venue for 519th Operations and Collection Management personnel to efficiently manage the overall HUMINT effort in the AOR. Based on the information obtained at these meetings, the Operations Officer (S3), and staff, of the 519th MI battalion developed HUMINT collection plans for the following day. Typically, the S3 collated the information from all available sources at the meetings, plotted the locations of incidents which had occurred on a given day, analyzed the synthesized information for possible answers to existing PIR, and, determined how best to next deploy the CI/IPW Teams under 519th MI battalion control. Concurrently, the S3 appraised the various LNOs of potential activity that might occur or information that might become available in their respective areas of operations, and requested their units' active observation and immediate reporting of such information. Through the implementation of this HUMINT coordination meeting, the 519th MI was able to achieve a level of synergistic cooperation amongst the various HUMINT collectors that resulted in HUMINT collections that were proactive, and focused on answering the CJTF-180 Commander's PIR.⁴⁵

The 519th MI battalion's initiation of the daily HUMINT coordination meeting was a divergence from doctrine, and it was not the only non-standard use employment of HUMINT discovered in the research. A complete list of such nonstandard actions included the restructuring of CI/IPW Teams, and the unique application of HUMINT in the targeting process.

Normally, the units assigned to the XVIII Airborne Corps were manned at 100 percent or better strength levels; the 519th MI battalion was no exception. At 100 percent strength, the 519th was assigned nine CI and eight IPW Teams, but these teams were insufficient to adequately provide HUMINT coverage to all CJTF-190 operations. To remedy that shortfall, the commander of the 519th authorized the restructuring and creation of more CI/IPW Teams to meet the burgeoning HUMINT requirements. The restructuring was an event that was coordinated and implemented by the S3 of the 519th MI battalion, usually at the daily HUMINT coordination meetings. The restructuring was accomplished as needed, and resulted in the creation, at one point, of 24 separate HUMINT teams.⁴⁶

Additionally, HUMINT support to the targeting process diverged from doctrine, in both the 1BCT and TF Mountain. Within the 1BCT, HUMINT Teams provided much of the initial targeting information, but also accompanied dismounted patrols in the execution of operations and conducted "follow-up of initial source leads and confirmed or denied target locations."⁴⁷ Further, 1BCT developed a "bottom up" technique in which HUMINT Teams, along with an infantry patrol, would isolate a suspected target location; only after the target had been isolated was the strike or raid initiated.⁴⁸ In Task Force Mountain, targeting was modified by their creation of a

Sensor/Attack Matrix that listed all systems available to detect, track and attack targets, and permitted the targeting cell to "determine the best sensor-to-shooter linkages, based on response time lines."⁴⁹ In effect, TF Mountain planned to pair HUMINT sensors with aircraft shooters, and specifically relied upon CI teams to "gather information and confirm, deny and track High Payoff Targets (HPTs)."⁵⁰

Other Military HUMINT

Only a thorough analysis of the entire military structure deployed into Haiti would reveal the true breadth and scope of other HUMINT capable military forces supporting OUD. The primary forces, however, those which were actively engaged with the Haitian populace through fixed and roving patrols and presence missions, were the 1st and 2nd Brigades, and Task Force Mountain of the 10th MTN DIV, the SPMAGTF Caribbean, and the 3rd SFG.

On 19 September 1994, the 1st Brigade Combat Team (1BCT) air assaulted into lodgements at the Port-au-Prince International Airport and the maritime port facilities at Port-au-Prince. Establishing its AOR in Port-au-Prince, the 1BCT facilitated the secure flow of follow-on forces into PAP, prepared for and provided security for the 30 September 1994 planned demonstration which recognized (and maligned) the anniversary of the military coup which ousted President Aristide, established and operated Weapons Buy Back (WBB) sites throughout PAP, and, beginning on 1 October 1994, planned and executed cordon and search operations to find and confiscate illegal weapons in a series of weapons cache raids known as Mountain Strike Operations.⁵¹ Throughout its operations, the 1BCT collected and reported HUMINT information obtained through direct

observation and through information provided by Haitian civilians. 10th MTN DIV collection managers acknowledged the HUMINT capability of the various roving and static patrols and observation posts, and included that capability in their Collection Plan.⁵²

The 2BCT remained deployed aboard the USS Eisenhower until 24 September 1994, at which time the unit began deploying into Cap Haitien, in the northern sector of Haiti, with the mission to conduct a relief-in-place (RIP) with the SPMAGTF CARIB in that area.⁵³ Like the 1BCT in PAP, the 2BCT focused its efforts on establishing lodgements, and providing security in the Cap Haitien area, as well as conducting WBB programs and patrolling both the city and the countryside. Also like the 1BCT, 10th MTN DIV collection managers considered the capabilities of the deployed brigade, and tasked them when appropriate to collect specific information during the course of their operations.⁵⁴ In the course of its operations, the 2BCT obtained or observed information from HUMINT, which they reported to the 10 MTN DIV (JTF-190) command post.

Task Force Mountain was unique in that the 10th MTN DIV Commander formed this maneuver task force around the DIVARTY Headquarters, under the command of the Assistant Division Commander, thereby effectively creating a third maneuver brigade. Initially, TF Mountain was the controlling headquarters for the forces that conducted the initial entry operations in the PAP area. Among the forces under TF Mountain control were the 1BCT, as well as the engineer, military police, and aviation brigades of the 10th MTN DIV.⁵⁵ By early October 1994 the 10th MTN DIV established a secure environment in the PAP area, and TF Mountain relinquished control of those brigade sized elements back to the division (as JTF-190) but retained

control of two infantry battalions.⁵⁶ With these two battalions, and assorted support forces, TF Mountain continued to operate out of the PAP area, conducting patrols, WBB operations, and acting as the primary operational arm of the Mountain Strike Operations.⁵⁷ As a recognized collection asset, 10th MTN DIV collection management personnel incorporated the capabilities of TF Mountain into the overall collection plan, tasking the unit where applicable to collect and report specific intelligence information.⁵⁸

The SPMAGTF CARIB, a marine and naval force of approximately 19,000 personnel, had as its principal land force the 2nd Marines with augmentation from other II Marine Expeditionary Force (II MEF) units.⁵⁹ Assigned the Cap Haitien operational area, the SPMAGTF deployed two subordinate task forces on 20 September 1994, one task force to secure the Cap Haitien airfield and the second to secure the maritime port facilities. "Right on schedule and without incident,"⁶⁰ the Marines executed their mission successfully. From the 20 September 1994 until the 2 October 1994, when their full relief in place by the 2BCT was complete, the SPMAGTF engaged in presence patrols, food distribution, security operations and weapons cache raid operations both in Cap Haitien and in the surrounding countryside. Supported by some three dozen DOD supplied linguists, and its own Surveillance, Reconnaissance and Intelligence Group (SRIG), the Marine forces began to collect and report HUMINT almost immediately upon occupying their initial objectives.⁶¹

The 3rd Special Forces Group deployed its 2nd Battalion and requisite support as Task Force Raleigh (alternatively known as Task Force Black). From initial lodgements at the Port-au-Prince International

Airport (PIA), TF Raleigh Teams (both ODA and ODB) fanned out into the Haitian country side using a "hub and spoke"⁶² concept: from a hub at PIA, ODA and ODB teams traveled out on spokes to the towns of Gonaives, Cap Haitien, Camp D'Application and Jacmel. In turn, each of those towns became hubs for further deployments.⁶³ TF Raleigh eventually occupied positions in over 27 separate locations throughout Haiti.⁶⁴ From these remote locations, TF Raleigh Teams executed several "force protection"⁶⁵ activities, including unilateral patrols and weapons searches, as well as curfew enforcement, detainee, and checkpoint operations. Each of these activities brought TF Raleigh personnel into contact with Haitians and facilitated the acquisition and reporting of HUMINT information. Relying upon their organic satellite communications (SATCOM) capabilities, TF Raleigh teams reported "real time intelligence"⁶⁶ which provided immediate ground truth on any given situation as it occurred.

Other Human Intelligence

In addition to the uniformed capabilities of the CJTF-180, there existed in Haiti a robust network of organizations and people, from governmental and non-governmental as well as private sectors, that were either proactively reporting information, or could be counted on to provide information if so requested;⁶⁷ however, these organizations and people were not formally managed as intelligence collectors. Included in the network were the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the FAH, the US Embassy, Haitian citizens, and United States citizens.⁶⁸ An additional source of information was the Cable News Network (CNN). The importance of CNN reporting was underscored by the placement of a

television monitor at the CJTF-180 Command Post aboard the USS Mount Whitney, which was tuned to CNN and used to monitor events and operations as they occurred.⁶⁹

In conclusion, the research thus showed that CJTF-180 deployed to Operation Uphold Democracy with a robust HUMINT capability; one that incorporated the various skills and attributes of a wide range of military and non-military units and people. Once in Haiti, CJTF-180 managed those people and capabilities largely in accordance with doctrine, but diverged from doctrine to more efficiently control HUMINT collection operations throughout the country. Having established that CJTF-180 was positioned to efficiently execute HUMINT collection operations, the research then turned to a study of the effectiveness of those collection operations. In the following chapter the research details the daily conduct of HUMINT collection operations for the critical first twenty-seven days of Operation Uphold Democracy, citing those specific instances where HUMINT information was used to guide and shape the conduct of operations throughout Haiti.

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⁶⁹H. Hugh Shelton and Timothy D. Vane, "Winning the Information War in HAITI", Military Review 75 (November-December 1995), 7.

CHAPTER 5

TWENTY-SEVEN CRITICAL DAYS

The research was based in considerable measure on the original documentation of units and individuals directly involved in OUD, much of which was initially classified information. As the classifying authority for the entire operation, Atlantic Command (ACOM) declassified much of the originally classified data concerning all actions and activities that occurred under the authority of OPLAN 2370/2380. Using that available declassified data, the research focused on the first twenty-seven days of OUD (i.e., 19 September through 15 October 1994). To aid in the organization of the research, and to facilitate the discovery of a causal relationship between HUMINT operations and the overall conduct of OUD, the information was originally discovered and is here related in chronological order using the military method of referring to the day an operation is initiated as D-Day, and each successive day as D+X (with X referring to the number of days after D-Day). Using that methodology, 19 September 1994 is D-Day and 15 October 1994 is D+26.

This study recognizes that all of the planning for OUD occurred prior to 19 September 1994, and that HUMINT probably supported that effort; further this study recognizes that OUD did not end on 15 October 1994, and that HUMINT probably continued to support the operation after that date. Prior to 19 September 1994, the military mission was not clear--in fact the decision to conduct a permissive peacekeeping mission was made at the

eleventh hour. After Aristide's return, the military mission again became nebulous with no clear military goal. In limiting the scope of the research to the first twenty-seven days, the research was able to focus on and evaluate the effectiveness of HUMINT support during a period in which the military mission was clear--set the conditions for Jean Bertrand Aristide's resumption of power on 15 October 1994.

D-Day: 19 SEPTEMBER 1994

On D-Day, or 19 OCT 94, CJTF 180 began landing in Haiti at 0930 hours. Task Force Mountain, 10th Mountain Division, initially occupied and secured the Port au Prince International Airport to facilitate the further air-landings of the remainder of the CJTF 180 land force.

Prior to 0930 hours, all intelligence concerning Haiti came from non-tactical elements: State Department and other national level DOD sources provided the initial assessment of the situation facing the peace enforcing troops. However, with the arrival of the first soldier on the ground, so too began the collection and reporting of HUMINT.

Guiding the activities of the information collectors was the Commander's Priority Intelligence Requirements, or PIR. On that day, the CDR's PIR were five in number:

1. What is the threat to U.S. forces and personnel? Special attention to the FRAPH.
2. Who are opposition leaders with potential for violence against US operations and what are their activities?
3. What are the disposition and intention of key FAd'H units? Special attention to the heavy weapons company (HWC), the harbor defense

unit (HDU), and the 4th and 22nd Companies of the Haitian Police Force.

4. What are the most likely participants, locations and conditions for Haitian-on-Haitian violence?

5. Where is Humanitarian assistance needed most critically within Haiti? What are the implications of perceived shortfalls in assistance?

Prior to the introduction of ground troops, intelligence indicators were that the Haitian people would portray an "initial bravado"² but that no organized resistance effort would form to confront the ground troops.³

Once troops were on the ground, initial intelligence reporting indicated that the Haitian were cooperating with the US troops and that no general outbreaks of violence had occurred in the area.⁴ With specific reference to Haitian military activity as a result of US troop introduction into Haiti, intelligence indicators were that the FAd'H showed no signs of resistance, all key weapons systems remained in place, and the military as a whole had adopted a "wait and see attitude."⁵

By 2000 hours, CJTF-190 had amassed a sizable force in the country of Haiti: in the Cap Haitian area the SPMAGTF's BLT had two teams ashore (TF Hawg and TF Irish);⁶ in Camp D'Application, TF Raleigh had inserted elements of 2-3 SFG⁷ and at the PAP International Airport, the bulk of the arriving land forces were assembled, including HQ JTF-190, 1BCT, 10 AVN BDE, 21 MP BN, 16 MP BDE, and TF Black.⁸

D+1: 20 SEPTEMBER 1994

Less than eighteen hours into the Operation, HUMINT reporting began to affect the operation. At the PAPIA, 10th MTN Division troops observed and reported the murder of a Haitian woman in a crowd near them; they did

not intervene because their Rules of Engagement (ROE) did not permit such interaction. Based on this HUMINT reporting, which addressed the CDR's PIR number 4⁹, the CDR CJTF 180 changed the ROE to permit all CJTF-180 forces to use both non-lethal and deadly force to prevent the loss of human life.¹⁰

As more and more elements of CJTF-180 began to arrive in country, the number of potential HUMINT reporters rose, as did the instances of HUMINT reporting. At 0650 hours, CTF-185 received reports from its personnel boat crewmen of crowds of 200 people forming at the landing sites in the vicinity of Port au Prince, and further reported that one individual had been observed brandishing a weapon in the pier area.¹¹

At 200958Q,¹² CTF-185 received a report that the port area in Cap Haitian was calm, and that SPMAGTF forces landing there were encountering no resistance. By 1127, the Battle Watch log recorded receipt of the information concerning the confrontation at the airport which resulted in the change to ROE.¹³

By 2000 hours on 20 September 1994, the preponderance of the SPMAGTF CARIB BLT was ashore in the Cap Haitian area, the majority of 1BCT, JTF 190 was ashore in the Port au Prince area, and approximately 460 personnel from TF Raleigh were ashore in the PAP area as well.¹⁴ All of the personnel assigned to these units contributed the HUMINT capability of CJTF-180.

Based in part on the HUMINT reports from troops on the ground, the J2, CJTF-180, in its daily update briefing to the Commander, was able to report the confrontation at the airport, the fact that Haitian military forces continued to passively observe the US forces buildup, and the nature

and actions of the crowds which formed wherever there was any US military activity. This information, although seemingly benign in merit, directly addressed the CDR's PIR 1 and 3.

D+2: 21 SEPTEMBER 1994

In the third day of US intervention in Haiti, CJTF-180 forces continued to flow into country. Adding significantly to the HUMINT capabilities was the additional insertion of 209 TF Raleigh personnel into Camp D'Application,¹⁵ and the initial 35 personnel from the JPOTF. Together with other troop additions this brought the total number of personnel on the ground in Haiti to 6,593,¹⁶ each and everyone of whom was a possible contributor to the HUMINT collection effort.

The potential utility of these 6000+ personnel in addressing the CDR's PIR was significant, given the threat as briefed by the J2, CJTF-180 on that date. In assessing the number of firearms in civilian hands, the J2 estimated 40,000 to 80,000 were throughout the country, with an estimated 35,000 in the Port-au-Prince area alone.¹⁷

D+3: 22 SEPTEMBER 1994

In the first real test of US intervention and potential Haitian resistance, TF Raleigh took control of Camp d'Application "without incident,"¹⁸ and began removing weapons and equipment from the Heavy Weapons Company, of the FAd'H, located there.¹⁹ Based on their activities and observations, TF Raleigh provided HUMINT reporting which accounted for 20 separate weapons and weapons systems, which confirmed the previously compiled order of battle (OB) on the FAd'H Heavy Weapons Company.

By the end of the day, US troop strength had increased to 8,118

personnel. Significantly, 505 of those personnel were members of the JSOTF, assigned to TF Raleigh.²⁰ These SOF elements began to fan out throughout the Haitian countryside virtually blanketing the country with HUMINT capability.

D+4: 23 SEPTEMBER 1994

The bulk of the JPOTF personnel arrived in Haiti on the 23rd of SEP, and with other troop arrivals, brought the total number of troops in Haiti to 10,255.²¹ Of significance was the dispersion of TF Raleigh SOF Teams throughout Haiti, which placed a HUMINT capability in over 27 separate locations,²² including all Haitian Administration Districts.²³

An additional action which increased the instances of personal interface between CJTF-180 personnel and Haitian nationals, and therefore possible collection of HUMINT information, was the "Cash for Guns" program.²⁴ Conceived by CJTF-180 as a four phase operation, Phase 1 saw the initiation of information collection and coordination activities designed to develop lists of personnel who were authorized to possess weapons, by type.²⁵

D+5: 24 SEPTEMBER 1994

As the fifth day of US intervention in Haiti unfolded, the rationale for the initial force protection/threat oriented CDR's PIR became apparent.²⁶ In Cap Haitian, a reinforced Squad from Company E, 2nd Battalion, 2nd Marines, of the Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force (SPMAGTF) Caribbean, was on routine patrol in the vicinity of the north Police Station when the patrol encountered and exchanged words with an armed Haitian standing there. A firefight ensued with that armed Haitian

as well as others in the Police Station, resulting in the death of ten Haitians, and the wounding of one US linguist.²⁷

Aboard the USS Mount Whitney, the command ship for the Commander JTF-180, watch officers gathered information from all relevant sources in an effort to understand the events in Cap Haitien as the situation unfolded. In addition to receiving reports from the Joint Intelligence Center, and the USS Wasp, the watch officers turned to CNN. As early as 242138,²⁸ CNN was providing reliable information from the scene. As a source of HUMINT information, this CNN report claimed that the wounded US troop was a US Marine, and not a US Navy linguist as previously reported by the USS Wasp; CNN was incorrect in this report. By 2230, CNN was again reporting information on the actual situation at the scene of the firefight, providing valuable information concerning the number and types of parties involved, and the status of US forces at the scene.²⁹

At the CJTF-180 level, intelligence staff officers continued to prepare and brief the Commander on information derived from all intelligence disciplines, including HUMINT. Significantly, the J2 briefed a new proposed PIR which clearly indicated the utility of HUMINT due to its quest for information concerning the plans and intentions of Haitians,³⁰ a type of information which fell squarely into the domain of HUMINT. These new proposed PIR also signified a narrowing of the focus of Operation Uphold Democracy; the forces involved with OUD now set their sights on the 30 SEP anniversary of the ouster of Aristide, as a potential obstacle to the successful return of Aristide on 15 October 1994.³¹

D+6: 25 SEPTEMBER 1994

At the beginning of the day on 25 SEPTEMBER 1994, US troop strength in Haiti totaled over 11,000 personnel.³² In addition to the physical presence and patrols of both BCTs of the 10th MTN DIV and the SPMAGTF, which saturated the areas of Port-au-Prince, the International Airport and Cap Haitian,³³ TF Raleigh had established operational support bases in Camp D'Application, Gonaives, and Jacmel in addition to Port-au-Prince and Cap Haitian.³⁴ The effect of these military forces was to increase the instances of HUMINT reporting throughout Haiti.

Augmenting the effects of increased US presence was the initiation of Phase 2 of the Weapons Buy-Back Program (WBB). In this phase, JPOTF forces initiated a month-long psychological operations (PSYOP) campaign to inform and explain the WBB policy to Haitian general public.³⁵ In this first day of the WBB program only eight weapons and/or explosives devices were turned-in to US Forces at the Bowen Airfield collection site. Concerned with the small turn-out for the WBB program, JTF-190 dispatched "HUMINT and Interpreter/Interrogation teams"³⁶ on a nonstandard intelligence mission to collect information to determine why Haitian turn-out at the WBB site was so low.³⁷ The HUMINT information resulting from this mission revealed that the Haitian people were afraid of the Haitian Police and FAAd'H personnel in the area of the WBB site; they were apprehensive of the Press, which "tended to mob any person trying to enter and turn over weapons;" and, they were afraid of reprisals and the inability to protect themselves during the anticipated 30 SEP coup anniversary demonstrations.³⁸ Based on the information provided by these

HUMINT collectors, the JFICC joined with the J2 and J3 in recommending that the PSYOP campaign continue.³⁹

In other operations on this day, the SPMAGTF planned to conduct two raids against suspected arms caches--one in Limbe, the other in Riviere du Nord. Using the assistance of HUMINT "sources,"⁴⁰ the raid against Limbe was executed with some success--the Marines seized over 140 weapons, including rifles, machineguns, grenade launchers and pistols.⁴¹

Throughout Haiti, crowds reacted to the previous day's firefight. In Cap Haitian, "hundreds of Haitians plundered four police stations and brought chaos to the city,"⁴² with some instances of Haitian-on-Haitian violence. At 2245, JTF 190 was apprised of a drive by shooting in central PAP.⁴³ At the North Police Station, SPMAGTF troops reported that Captain Givaud, the commander of the Police Station, "was upset and wanted to fight."⁴⁴ At 2330 hours, an "American Citizen at the scene"⁴⁵ reported that a crowd of Haitians was in the process of looting a warehouse in Cap Haitien. This HUMINT information was relayed to the SPMAGTF, which dispatched the Light Armored Reconnaissance (LAR) Company to the scene to disperse the crowd.⁴⁶

At the scheduled Commander's Update Briefing that evening, J2 intelligence personnel reported the day's "scattered minor incidents,"⁴⁷ and predicted continued isolated aggression against OUD troops, while renewing their focus on the 30 SEP coup anniversary date. Significantly, the J2 also briefed a plan to "deny FRAPH the use of their radios."⁴⁸ This event signaled a move which would increase their reliance upon HUMINT information for the duration of Operation Uphold Democracy.

D+7: 26 SEPTEMBER 1994

On D+7 the original Commander's PIR remained the focus of intelligence collection efforts, and the conduct of patrols throughout the JTF-190 area of responsibility was affected by the requirement to obtain intelligence information.⁴⁹ JTF-190 provided CJTF-180 a graphic overlay depicting all friendly graphic control measures as well as routes of patrols planned for the next 72 hours. Along with those graphic products, JTF-190 posted an "expert" at the CJTF-180 headquarters to answer any questions concerning those graphics and plans.⁵⁰

In addition to information collection and reporting capabilities organic to an infantry company, CJTF-180 reorganized its Counterintelligence and Interrogation Teams and dispatched them to accompany the infantry patrols.⁵¹ Response to the incorporation of CI/IPW HUMINT Teams into patrols was positive,⁵² and was another testament to importance of HUMINT in the overall operation. At the JTF-190 Joint Fires Coordination Center (JFCC), prioritization of targeting was based on HUMINT reporting, and HUMINT collectors were instrumental in each of the Decide, Detect, Deliver, and Assess (D3A) phases of the Joint targeting process.⁵³

Reports from the various patrols and HUMINT teams included information concerning the looting of two food warehouses in Cap Haitian,⁵⁴ the location and activities of a car full of heavily armed men roaming in Cap Haitian,⁵⁵ and the existence and partial identity of an individual said to be "hired to kill US personnel assisting new government."⁵⁶

Augmenting the HUMINT capabilities of the newly instituted patrols was TF Raleigh with its expansion of activities into the areas of Les Cayes, Jeremie and Port du Paix.

D+8: 27 SEPTEMBER 1994

D+8 marked an increase in the level and intensity of Haitian actions, as well as an increase in the operational tempo of the assigned CJTF-190 forces. At 0700, the SPMAGTF reported that Cap Haitian was "quiet all last night,"⁵⁷ but two hours later, CNN was reporting that 10,000 Aristide supporters were demonstrating in Cap Haitian, and that all Haitian Armed Forces were departing, leaving the area "ripe for looting."⁵⁸ Elements of the 2BCT had closed on Cap Haitian at 1830 the night before, and were preparing for the routine relief in place with the SPMAGTF. As part of that effort, TF 2-87 began conducting joint patrols with the SPMAGTF in the Cap Haitian area.⁵⁹

By 1200 hours, the situation in northern Haiti seemed to be growing out of control. In the city of Lemby, civilian riots and disorder precipitated attacks on the FAd'H and Police headquarters, FAd'H members were taken prisoner and their houses were attacked. In Petiputabone, similarly rioting civilians overran the police headquarters, and seized all police weapons; all police and military outposts in the area were abandoned.⁶⁰ Further HUMINT reporting identified crowds rioting and looting at the La Saline Kids School.⁶¹

At 1700 hours, the riotous situation in Los Cayes had deteriorated to the extent that TF Raleigh units in the area appeared to be in need of extraction.⁶² The JTF-190 Quick Reaction Aviation Force was dispatched to the area and reported that the civilian crowds had threatened the ODB but extraction was no longer needed.⁶³

In further HUMINT reporting, CJTF-190 received information that a person listed on the "Top Twenty-five" list, known only as "Bobby," had

been seen at the PAP Police Station. In a cooperative action, LTC Francios Josephat discussed the issue of "Bobby" with the Commander of the 16th MP BDE, and agreed to support an effort to apprehend "Bobby."⁶⁴

D+9: 28 SEPTEMBER 1994

On 28 September 1994, ten days into Operation Uphold Democracy, the cooperative efforts of maneuver and intelligence forces began to bear fruit throughout the nation of Haiti. Over 17,000 US troops were on the ground,⁶⁵ and through them the WBB program was in full swing, and intelligence collection was sufficient to target and conduct raids on suspected weapons cache sites throughout Haiti.

In Les Cayes, TF Raleigh forces discovered 30 prisoners in the police station;⁶⁶ at Bowen airfield, JTF-190 forces received over 45 weapons at the WBB site;⁶⁷ in Cap Haitian, SPMAGTF forces planned and conducted raids against suspected arms caches in Laborgne and investigated reports of rioting in Limbe;⁶⁸ and, in Port-au-Prince both CNN and JTF-190 forces reported hearing shots fired in the vicinity of the US Embassy.⁶⁹ At the scene of those shots, a "reliable CI informant" provided HUMINT which attributed the shots to attaches.⁷⁰

At approximately 1800 hours, a US DOD media pool journalist reported shots fired and a wounded Haitian near the embassy.⁷¹ Based on that HUMINT reporting, JTF-190 forces adjacent to the Embassy were tasked to investigate.⁷²

A final HUMINT report on 28 September 1994 addressed the CDR's PIR which questioned the disposition and intentions of key FAd'H units. In that report, a FAd'H liaison officer (LNO) reported that two primary

weapons systems at the FAd'H headquarters were being removed without permission of the US Forces.⁷³ This information was an accurate and timely report on the disposition of key FAd'H units, although the actual movement of the weapons systems had been previously coordinated and was authorized.⁷⁴

D+10: 29 SEPTEMBER 1994

The incidence of Haitian-on-Haitian violence and general civil unrest continued to accelerate in anticipation of the 30 September 1994 coup anniversary date. At 0955, the J2 reported that two Haitian radio stations were reporting possible Anti-Aristide coup attempts on 8 October 1994;⁷⁵ JTF-190 patrols reported numerous Haitians with machetes forming crowds in the Bel Air section of Port-au-Prince at 1010 hours;⁷⁶ and, a 20th Engineer Battalion report described Port-au-Prince police killing pro-Aristide Haitians.⁷⁷

Contributing to the situation was a ceremony staged to mark the reinstallation of Evans Paul, the duly elected Mayor of Port-au-Prince. Following that ceremony, JTF-190 reported that the situation in the area was "all calm"⁷⁸ at 1340 hours, but by 1402, CNN reported that the "mass celebration turned ugly;"⁷⁹ in fact "a terrorist grenade attack"⁸⁰ killed 16 and wounded over 60 Haitians after the ceremony. An initial Spot Report from the CJTF-190 forces reported that "Sources indicate attack likely initiated by FRAPH personnel," and "events similar to this are highly likely tomorrow."⁸¹

By 1630 hours the CJTF-190 had received and reported other HUMINT information which amplified its earlier report. This new information

indicated that leaders of the FRAPH, Marcel Mouressante and Jodel Chamberlain, were responsible for the attack and identified the possibility of a similar attack in the vicinity of the Marine House, which was the designation for the building where the US Embassy Marine Security Guard Detachment lived.⁸² Other HUMINT sources at the scene reported seeing a vehicle which belonged to "Bobby," implicating his involvement in the attack. While CJTF-190 assessed the reliability of the information as F6, or unknown, they did recognize that the grenade attack "matches the MO of 'Bobby'."⁸³ This information heightened awareness of "Bobby," and lead JTF-190 forces to actively seek him out.⁸⁴

The degree and intensity of Anti-Aristide activity was evidenced by another HUMINT report which was received at CJTF-180 at approximately 2000 hours. A reliable HUMINT source⁸⁵ provided information concerning a heavily guarded FRAPH meeting in Port-au-Prince, in which the participants were planning "something big."⁸⁶

In other developments on D+10, TF Raleigh forces reported that a crowd of Haitians had broken into a jail and "liberated" 52 prisoners in Gonaives,⁸⁷ while in Limbe and Grand Riviere, FAd'H personnel had requested the TF Raleigh take them into protective custody.⁸⁸

D+11: 30 SEPTEMBER 1994

The third anniversary of the military coup which ousted Jean Bertrand Aristide was met by a US military presence of almost 20,000 troops.⁸⁹ The principle land force, JTF-190 (10 MTN DIV) had prepared a Defense in Depth⁹⁰ in the Port-au-Prince area, in anticipation of demonstrations and marches by crowds of up to 100,000 people,⁹¹ and had

dispatched troops to secure the radio and TV station.⁹² To assure the maintenance of peace in the Port-au-Prince area, JTF-190 used all maneuver forces available, including fourteen Rifle Companies, two Tank Companies, one Mechanized Infantry Company, and eight Military Police Companies.⁹³ In other areas, TF Raleigh forces were prepared to conduct show-of-force operations in Les Cayes and Jeremie,⁹⁴ and SPMAGTF and JTF-190 forces continued to patrol the Cap Haitien area.

At approximately 0800 hours the first HUMINT reports of unruly crowds and looting in Port-au-Prince began to arrive at JTF-190.⁹⁵ Reports began to flow in from HUMINT sources: CNN televised and reported on Haitian looting a warehouse in Port-au-Prince at 0917,⁹⁶ and by 0955, the JTF-190 Commander had ordered Military Policemen to the location reported on CNN;⁹⁷ MPs observed four armed Haitians entering a building PAP at 0950,⁹⁸ and JTF-190 troops moved in to investigate;⁹⁹ at 1041, elements of 1BCT spotted and reported "Bobby" driving east through Port-au-Prince, and were granted immediate authorization to apprehend him;¹⁰⁰ at 1050 hours, elements of the 1BCT apprehended "Bobby" and transported him to the Bowen Airfield detention facility,¹⁰¹ where at approximately 1100 hours, his identity was confirmed.¹⁰²

In further HUMINT reporting at 1150, an individual provided information to JTF-190 troops at the Mayor's Building concerning a plot to launch a grenade attack against the Mayor's Building;¹⁰³ at 1215 an individual reported observing Attaches firing from FAd'H Headquarters;¹⁰⁴ and, at 1235, an individual reported observing armed Attache's and FAd'H members in amongst the demonstrating crowds.¹⁰⁵

At midday, the situation in Port-au-Prince turned violent with CNN reporting shots fired in the vicinity of the FRAPH headquarters,¹⁰⁴ and JTF-190 reports of shots fired in the vicinity of the National Radio Station.¹⁰⁷ As the day's activities unfolded, two news reporters became casualties themselves: an NBC reporter was sustained a head injury from a thrown rock, and a Reuters reporter was shot.¹⁰⁶ The majority of the demonstrators began to disperse after noon, and by 1300 numbered no more than 5,000.¹⁰⁸

Although the intensity of the demonstrations began to subside, the importance of HUMINT reporting continued. At 1515, Civil Affairs units reported shots being fired and armed Haitians on a rooftop in the vicinity of a USAID food warehouse,¹¹⁰ and at 1714, NAVFOR units reported shots fired and armed individuals in the Port-au-Prince harbor area.¹¹¹

A significant information report from a HUMINT source was received by CJTF-180 at 2030 hours. In that report, the Joint Information Bureau relayed information it had received regarding planned drive-by shootings. The report detailed both the targets and vehicles to be involved in the attack.¹¹²

As the day wound to a close, CJTF-180 received the initial results of the Interrogation of "Bobby": "Bobby" provided the names of his four accomplices, identified the Police Captain who had thrown the grenade which killed 16 Haitians on 28 September 1994, and had consented to a search of his home.¹¹³ Additionally, "Bobby" identified a Gerry Moura as a "bad guy,"¹¹⁴ one of the self-described Ninjas.

D+12: 1 OCTOBER 1994

In the aftermath of the 30 September 1994 demonstrations and violence, CJTF-180 redirected its focus towards preparation for Aristide's arrival. To that end, Operation Uphold Democracy once again became an effort to control violence in Haiti by removing weapons, both through the WBB program and in a new initiative, through raids on suspected cache sites. By 1 October 1994, WBB sites were operating at Port-au-Prince International Airport, the Industrial Complex, Bowen Field and at the port in Port-au-Prince.¹¹⁵

On 1 October 1994, JTF-190 began a series of weapons cache raids which came to be known as "Mountain Strike"¹¹⁶ operations. These operations were "designed to strike at known caches of weapons or to seize personnel."¹¹⁷ Of the 38 Mountain Strike operations conducted by JTF-190, most were executed between the first and the tenth of October, and were conducted by company sized combined arms teams, in the Port-au-Prince area. Significantly, each Mountain Strike operation included a CI/IPW Team comprised of Counterintelligence Agents and Interrogators.¹¹⁸ To support the requirement for CI Teams throughout the JTF-180 AOR, the 525th MI BDE reorganized its CI and IPW Teams into smaller elements, thereby increasing the net number of teams from 18 to 25.¹¹⁹ TF Raleigh and SPMAGTF elements also conducted weapons cache raid operations, in Cap Haitien as well as in many outlying areas in Haiti.

Although the HUMINT effort was reorganized in non-doctrinal CI/IPW Teams,¹²⁰ those teams were employed in a manner which was both doctrinally appropriate and highly successful to the Mountain Strike Operations.¹²¹ In conducting Mountain Strike Operations,¹²² CI/IPW Teams used doctrinal cordon

and search methodology as described in FM 34-60, Counterintelligence,¹²³ and doctrinal interrogation techniques as described in FM 34-52, Intelligence Interrogation.¹²⁴

HUMINT, as an integral component of the overall D3A process,¹²⁵ became the primary form of intelligence information used to plan, conduct and assess Mountain Strike Operations.¹²⁶ On the first of October, CJTF-180 issued seven suspected cache site targets to JTF-190,¹²⁷ which JTF-190 planned to "strike" at 1500 hours.¹²⁸ The information concerning the locations of those suspected weapons cache sites came, in part, from HUMINT--interrogation of "Bobby."¹²⁹

Of all the sites targeted on the first of October, the Killock Naval Base and Quanaminthe sites were most productive. In Killock, JTF-190 forces captured over 119 weapons, including 11 Caliber .50 Machine Guns,¹³⁰ while in Quanaminthe a combined SPMAGTF and TF Raleigh operation¹³¹ netted several hundred weapons.¹³² The remainder of the seven sites targeted were without weapons, although the Ft. Dimanche site uncovered approximately 100,000 rounds of small arms ammunition which appeared to be unstable (i.e., volatile or dangerous to handle),¹³³ as well as a small amount of weapons.

During the execution of Mountain Strike Operations, the CJTF-180 continued to rely upon HUMINT reports from the field to track, develop and understand the situation throughout Haiti. At 0925, CNN reported large crowds and "looting"¹³⁴ in Port-au-Prince; by 0955, JTF-190 had responded with Military Police and aerial loudspeaker teams to disperse the crowds.¹³⁵

At 1425 hours, a patrol from 1-87 IN/1BCT reported that Haitian police needed assistance controlling a crowd of approximately 100 Haitians engaged

in "throwing bricks off rooftops;"¹³⁸ the Battle Staff passed the message to the 16th MP Brigade, elements of which responded and reported from the scene within 20 minutes.¹³⁹ In a related development at the scene of the brick throwers, personnel from the 20th Eng Bde reported finding a Haitian male, possibly a Haitian policeman, who had been shot.¹⁴⁰ And, in a final HUMINT report on the first of October, an Agency for International Development (AID) employee reported that he had received a "tip" that his warehouse would be raided that evening.¹³⁹

D+13: 2 OCTOBER 1994

The cumulative effect of continuous HUMINT operations began to bear fruit two weeks into Operation Uphold Democracy. On this day, acting on HUMINT information,¹⁴⁰ JTF-190 deployed three company sized elements on Mountain Strike missions to "The Catsup Factory, the Methodist Publishing House and the Acierie Warehouse."¹⁴¹ The Catsup Factory was rumored to be owned by "Black Ninjas,"¹⁴² and by day's end a reputed significant "Ninja" had been detained. By approximately 1600 hours, elements of 1BCT reported that they believed they had "captured Gerry Mourra;"¹⁴³ their tentative identification of Mourra was based on a physical description and information concerning his vehicle originally obtained from HUMINT-- interrogation of "Bobby."¹⁴⁴ Mourra's identity was later verified by the Commander, 1-87 IN, at the scene of his capture.

At his daily Commander's Update Briefing, the CG, CJTF-180 directed that plans be made to search Mourra's house;¹⁴⁵ by 0100 hours, JTF-190 had finalized those plans, as well as a plan to execute Mountain Strike #3

which targeted a suspected FRAPH Headquarters, and forwarded them to the CJTF-180 headquarters.¹⁴⁶

D+14: 3 OCTOBER 1994

A significant occurrence that colored the events of D+14 actually transpired at approximately 2345 on the second of October.¹⁴⁷ At that time, a member of an ODA Team in Les Cayes was shot and wounded by a suspected FRAPH member. In planning a response to the action, the Commander of TF Raleigh, Brigadier General Potter, recommended the insertion of a Ranger Company as a demonstration of force.¹⁴⁸ Major General Schoomaker, the Commander of CJTF-188 (the JSOTF) echoed that recommendation, and requested to launch a Ranger Company by 0530 hours.¹⁴⁹ After much discussion between MG Meade, Commander of CJTF-190, and others the commander of CJTF-190 authorized the Ranger insertion to accomplish the following: conduct extensive patrolling, search for FAd'H, FRAPH and Attaches, and be prepared to seize weapons caches and personnel.¹⁵⁰ At 0526 hours, the mission was launched.¹⁵¹

While the activities in Les Cayes captured the attention of the TF Raleigh and the CJTF-190 and 180 command groups, less intense activities occurred in PAP which drew the attention of 1BCT, resulting in the acquisition and reporting of HUMINT. At 0045 hours, a 1BCT patrol observed a group of Haitians looting a food warehouse which resulted in the patrol firing a warning shot to disperse the looters.¹⁵² A similar incident at the same warehouse was observed and reported by 1BCT four hours later, although by then the crowd had grown to 30 Haitians.¹⁵³ A still larger crowd, approximately 250 in number, was reported looting the ADRA Warehouse at

0758 hours and within 12 minutes, TF Mountain had dispatched an MP platoon to the scene.¹⁵⁴

By 1000 hours Mountain Strike #3 was underway,¹⁵⁵ and within 22 minutes, JTF-190 submitted an initial situation report (SITREP) describing the successful apprehension of 40 persons, weapons, a radio, and a molotov cocktail.¹⁵⁶ By 1300 hours, TF Mountain had completed all Mountain Strike operations, seizing more weaponry and explosives.¹⁵⁷ During the course of the day's operations, TF Mountain personnel received HUMINT concerning a second residence belonging to Gerry Mourra, and the possibility that weapons were cached there. Upon searching that residence, TF Mountain personnel discovered three hand grenades, but no weapons cache.¹⁵⁸

Compared to the HUMINT which resulted in the seizure of three hand grenades by TF Mountain in Port-au-Prince, the HUMINT received by 2BCT in Cap Haitien was extraordinary. Acting on a HUMINT report of an ongoing FRAPH meeting, the 2BCT conducted a reconnaissance in force which netted 75 detainees, and documents which indicated "long term intentions and methods for disrupting U.S. efforts" in Haiti.¹⁵⁹ In complimentary HUMINT operations, CI and Interrogator personnel attached to 2BCT then screened the 75 detainees to identify "hardcore anti-american"¹⁶⁰ Haitians for transportation to the Joint Detention Facility at PAP.

Based on results of the day's operations, JTF-190 developed plans for conducting two Mountain Strike Operations on the following day. Additionally, JTF-190 anticipated developing further targets based on ongoing detainee "debriefs".¹⁶¹

D+15: 4 OCTOBER 1994

At 0930 hours Mountain Strike #5 commenced, and by the end of the day cordon and search operations at the three objective locations resulted in the seizure of documents and weapons, but no further detainees.¹⁶²

In HUMINT specific reporting on the fourth of October, the 20th Engineer Bde observed and reported shots being fired near Base Camp Dragon,¹⁶³ and gate guards of the 1BCT at Bowen Air Field reported observing adults "shooing" children away from the gate; upon questioning the adults, 1BCT reported that the adults expected a "drive by shooting" at that location.¹⁶⁴ Based on this HUMINT reporting, the 1BCT requested that MP presence in the area be increased.¹⁶⁵

In final HUMINT related reporting on the fourth of October, JTF-190 reported that a total of 108 detainees were currently under US control. Further, screening operations determined that 25 detainees in Port-au-Prince were "innocents;"¹⁶⁶ and, in accordance with CJTF-190 policy and the recommendation of the 525th MI Bde Commander, those 25 detainees were released later that day.

D+16: 5 OCTOBER 1994

HUMINT support to operations on the fifth of October included the "interrogation"¹⁶⁷ of the suspect apprehended on the fourth of October in an incident in which a car was driven into a crowd of people Cap Haitien. The crowd included 300-400 Lavalas Party supporters attending a pro-Aristide/pro-U.S. rally. Using the capabilities of their attached CI/IPW Team, the 2BCT was able to identify the suspect, and make an initial determination that the incident was intentional.¹⁶⁸

On this day in PAP, the 1BCT planned and executed strikes, known as Mountain Strike 6, against two suspected weapons cache sites.¹⁶⁹ By 1000 hours, Mountain Strike 6 was well underway and had netted some weapons and reloading equipment. At one of the suspected cache sites, HUMINT received at the scene provided information concerning a possible weapons cache site located nearby. Acting on this HUMINT, the 1BCT team raided the newly developed site with good results: in addition to seizing a machete and bayonets, the team discovered and apprehended a Haitian known as Samuel Cherry--one of the individuals listed on the CJTF-190 Top 25 wanted list.¹⁷⁰

In further HUMINT reporting, the HACC reported looting at a warehouse in south PAP at 1025, which resulted in the dispatch of an MP patrol to the scene.¹⁷¹ In central PAP, 1BCT guards at an Observation Post (OP) reported observing children being "shooed away, just as yesterday." Sensitized by similar HUMINT reporting on 4 OCT, JTF-190 notified all operational elements and placed its Quick Reaction Force (QRF) on alert for a potential drive-by shooting.¹⁷² At approximately 2100 hours, a member of TF Raleigh, in Miragoane, reported Haitian on Haitian violence and requested medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) for a Haitian wounded in the side by an arrow. A MEDEVAC helicopter recovered and transported the injured man to the 28th CASH by 2206 hours.¹⁷³

A noteworthy HUMINT supported operation was executed by TF Raleigh in the town of Ft Liberte. Based on intelligence provided by their MI Detachment, TF Raleigh personnel went to Fort Liberte to find and apprehend a prominent FRAPH supporter. Having eventually found their "target,"¹⁷⁴ TF Raleigh transported him to the JDF in PAP for detention and questioning.

D+17: 6 OCTOBER 1994

Events on the sixth of October began to unfold much like the events in the several days preceding it: at approximately 0200 hours, the 10th Forward Support Battalion (FSB) reported a riot in progress on Deimas Street, and this information was supported by a similar report from the US Embassy, which added that a warehouse at the location was being raided.¹⁷⁵ At a 1BCT OP in central PAP, soldiers from 1-22IN reported a crowd of 20-30 Haitians breaking into a building, and eventually erupting into a Haitian on Haitian firefight. CJTF-190 dispatched an MP patrol to the scene, which assisted in dispersing the unruly crowd.¹⁷⁶

At 0700 hours, TF Mountain deployed Mountain Strike 7 teams to two suspected weapons cache sites in PAP.¹⁷⁷ Within two hours TF Mountain had completed the operations, and seized several weapons. Significantly, these strikes were aimed at suspected headquarters and compound sites of an anti-Aristide organization dubbed the "Omega Group."¹⁷⁸ This group was identified and its locations plotted through the collection and analysis of HUMINT information flowing into the 519th MI Bn Tactical Operations Center.¹⁷⁹

At approximately 1200 hours, the now firmly established HUMINT collection and reporting nets, both official and unofficial, began to function smoothly: A crowd of approximately three hundred Haitians were attempting to break in to the Hydro-electric power plant at Peligre; the plant owner telephoned the HACC; the HACC passed the report on to CJTF-190; and, CJTF-190 alerted its Quick Reaction Force and launched a Scout Weapons Team to the site as a show of force. The crowd readily dispersed.¹⁸⁰

In other HUMINT reporting, the US Embassy reported that the Haitian Prime Minister had discovered discarded weapons near his home; CJTF-190 dispatched an MP patrol to the scene.¹⁸¹ The LRSD of the 110th MI Battalion, providing security at the PAP Mayors Office, observed and reported armed Haitians, suspected FRAPH members, physically abusing other Haitians near the Mayor's Office.¹⁸² A TF Mountain patrol observed and reported the description and license plate number of a car in which armed Haitians were driving while pointing a weapon out the car window.¹⁸³ A separate HUMINT report, forwarded by the US Embassy, concerned information provided by a civilian businessman who observed Haitians looting a warehouse in central PAP.¹⁸⁴

At approximately 1400 hours, an event occurred which highlighted the HUMINT potential in an otherwise un-tasked HUMINT source. Soldiers from 1-7 FA Battalion, TF Mountain, detained six Haitians to seize their weapons, and discovered that the Haitians possessed a map of the Hotel Haitian. This event was significant in that a coalition of International Police Monitors (IPM) were soon to arrive and reside at that very Hotel. The 10th MP Company was notified, and dispatched an MP Patrol to transport the Haitians to the JDF, for further questioning.¹⁸⁵

CJTF-190 continued to plan Mountain Strike Operations, and by 2100 hours had finalized, and forwarded plans to conduct Mountain Strike 8, on 7 OCT 94. Included in the plans were three suspected weapons cache sites that would be targeted by the 1BCT, and one site to be targeted by TF Mountain.¹⁸⁶

D+18: 7 OCTOBER 1994

Beginning at approximately 0500 hours, Mountain Strike 8 operations were underway.¹⁸⁷ By 0511, elements of 1BCT had established both inner and outer cordons at the initial objective,¹⁸⁸ and within 11 minutes had seized weapons and ammunition, and obtained HUMINT concerning a separate possible cache site at a nearby house. Based on that developed HUMINT, 1BCT deployed a strike team to the suspect site. By 0545 hours, 1BCT had completed its assigned strike missions and seized several pistols and shotguns, an UZI machine gun and an M1 rifle, as well as portable radios and riot control gear.¹⁸⁹

TF Mountain encountered initial, passive, resistance while raiding a suspected FRAPH weapons cache in central PAP. At that site, Haitians had barricaded themselves in a building and refused to exit. Suspecting that the Haitians were armed FRAPH members, the strike team employed smoke grenades, fired warning shots and entered and cleared the building. Inside the building they discovered a hole in the floor leading to a tunnel, but no weapons cache, although the strike team did apprehend two Haitians at the scene. In the task organization of the strike team was a CI/IPW Team; this team obtained HUMINT from the crowd gathered at the scene that indicated that the site had been a weapons cache, but that the weapons had been removed a few days prior.¹⁹⁰

In other HUMINT reporting on the seventh of October, 2BCT conducted a route reconnaissance to Dondon and a patrol to the town of Plaisance, from Cap Haitien; 2BCT reported that the route and the area were all clear and calm.¹⁹¹ In PAP, the LRSD continued its mission to provide security at the Mayors Office, and reported discovering a suspicious package near the

Mayor's home.¹⁹² Later, the LRSD observed and reported a blue Nissan, bearing license plate number AZ177, which was the same vehicle that had been reported the previous day.¹⁹³

D+19: 8 OCTOBER 1994

On the eighth of October, both CJCS General John Shalikashvili and Defense Secretary William Perry visited Haiti to assess the situation. Although their presence created a heightened sense of security, and selected units were tasked to provide escort and security details for their visit, the mission of CJTF-180 continued uninterrupted. At approximately 0445 hours, TF Mountain forces deployed two strike teams against three suspected weapons cache sites. By 0830 hours, the teams had established and conducted cordon and search operations at all three sites. The first two sites yielded no weapons or detainees, but the third site netted 10 detainees and a "30 page book of possible FRAPH addresses."¹⁹⁴ Prior HUMINT reporting indicated that Jo Jo Chamberlain, a key FRAPH leader named on the CJTF-190 list of Top 25 Personalities, was at the third site, and this strike was aimed at apprehending him.¹⁹⁵ Chamberlain was not at the site, and though HUMINT obtained at the scene indicated that Chamberlain was in the immediate area, he was not found.¹⁹⁶

In the Cap Haitien area of operations, 2BCT conducted further reconnaissance and patrol operations. One unit conducted a route reconnaissance from Cap Haitien to Quanaminthe, and reported the route open and clear; in Quanaminthe, the unit conducted patrols throughout the town, and reported the town calm and secure.¹⁹⁷ In Cap Haitien, a separate unit

conducted both mounted and dismounted patrols throughout the city, but reported no significant activity or occurrences while on patrol.¹⁹⁷

At the sea port in PAP, an unidentified Haitian provided information concerning a "FRAPH high ranking official,"¹⁹⁸ who wanted to surrender himself to US officials but feared for his life in doing so. This HUMINT information was obtained by a 96th Civil Affairs Battalion soldier, who reported the information to TF Mountain, who in turn notified a CI Team from the 519th MI Battalion for action.²⁰⁰

D+20: 9 OCTOBER 1994

HUMINT reports originated in a variety of units and locations on the ninth of October. By 0900 hours, Mountain Strike #10, a raid against three suspected weapons caches, began to bear fruit. At the first two sites, 1BCT seized weapons, grenades and documents. Significantly, the strike team also found and detained a Haitian national named Esperance, who was a known FRAPH Attache, and who's name was listed on the CJTF-190 Top Twenty Five list.²⁰¹

In further 1BCT reports, another Top Twenty Five listed FRAPH Attache, D'Ariste Montasse, was detained and transported to the JDF by soldiers from the 1-22IN battalion.²⁰² That same battalion also reported the results of their patrols in PAP, in which they had observed and detained three Haitian police officers who were engaged in disrupting a peaceful crowd of Haitians.²⁰³

Soldiers assigned to TF Mountain observed and reported the exchange of gunfire between elements of a TF Raleigh convoy and unknown Haitians, in

the vicinity of the Light Industrial Complex.²⁰⁴ Based on that HUMINT report, CJTF-190 dispatched an MP patrol to the area to investigate.²⁰⁵

TF Raleigh specific reporting included information concerning an incident in Dessaline Barracks in which an unknown Haitian drove his car into a crowd of Haitian nationals. Based on that HUMINT report, CJTF-190 dispatched an MP patrol to the area.²⁰⁶ In a similar set of circumstances, an SF Team at Miragoane reported that a bus had driven into a crowd on route 200, and had fled the scene. In concluding their report, the SF Team reported that they were establishing a road block to attempt to capture the bus and driver.²⁰⁷ In the first incident, the MP patrol investigated and reported that the initial report was false, that in fact a Haitian woman had given birth in a gathering crowd of onlookers.²⁰⁸ In the second incident, the J2, CJTF-190 determined that the "hit and run" actually occurred, and appeared to have been intentional.²⁰⁹

D+21: 10 OCTOBER 1994

In the context of events unfolding in Haiti, the tenth of October was to be an historic day. On that day, Lieutenant General Cedras, the CINC of the Haitian Armed Forces and the de facto military dictator of Haiti, resigned his post and departed the country in fulfillment of the terms of the Carter/Jonaissant Agreement.

The deployed forces of CJTF-190 anticipated a resurgence of celebratory Haitian crowds recognizing the event; by 0700 the celebrations had begun. At approximately 0730, the CJTF-180 Corps Support Command (COSCOM) headquarters reported a crowd of 300 Haitians gathering and

threatening the physical integrity of a gate at the PAPIA. Based on this HUMINT, the CJTF-190 dispatched an MP patrol to the scene.²¹⁰

By 1030, a large crowd had formed at the Ministry Building in anticipation of LTG Cedras' planned departure, although political machinations kept LTG Cedras from departing until the thirteenth of October. The forming crowd, and its potential impact on US operations was covered by CNN, and monitored in the CJTF-180 Command Post.²¹¹

In what would be two of the final official Mountain Strike Operations, elements of 1BCT raided two suspected weapons caches, and by 0945 hours reported seizing two weapons and detaining two Haitians.²¹² As a result of increased security requirements for the return of President Aristide, CJTF-180 postponed further Mountain Strike Operations until the return of Aristide, citing the increased need for forces to fulfill security missions.²¹³ Part of the increased security requirements called for CJTF-190 forces to provide security for 13 separate ministry locations in PAP, while being prepared to provide security at the Presidential Palace as well as the Bank of Haiti.²¹⁴

The redirection of effort away from Mountain Strike Operations and patrolling drastically reduced the number of detainees being held at the JDF. When Mountain Strike Operations began, the number of detainees rose daily to a high of 91 men and three women on the eighth of October. The total dropped to 70 personnel by the tenth of October.²¹⁵ HUMINT information derived from those detainees was significant: by 10 October 1994, the JDF had produced 175 Intelligence Information Reports (IIR) and 165 Spot Reports.²¹⁶

D+22: 11 OCTOBER 1994

The eleventh of October was a transitory day in the conduct of operations in support of Operation Uphold Democracy. With all Mountain Strike weapons cache raids temporarily suspended, the focus of operations shifted to "preparing security operations for the return of Aristide."²¹⁷ The reorientation of effort was evidenced at the CJTF-180 Commander's Update Briefing, during which the J2 briefed the new information requirements under the heading "Return of Aristide CCIR (12-16 OCT, 1994)."²¹⁸

By 1745, CJTF-190 had successfully reoriented its operational focus and secured ten of the thirteen designated sites, without incident. Throughout the evening, discussions and coordination ensued which resulted in CJTF-190 being assigned still more security missions, at sites such as the National Archives, the Museum and the Library in PAP.²¹⁹ The net effect of this transition in operational activities was the slowing, almost to the point of a standstill, the incidence of HUMINT reporting.

D+23: 12 OCTOBER 1994

As the ground forces of CJTF-190 settled in to their new security missions, HUMINT collection and reporting resumed its prior pace. While securing the Presidential Palace, 1BCT forces observed and reported explosives in an underground bunker near the Palace.²²⁰ Based on that HUMINT, an Explosives Ordnance Disposal Team was dispatched to the scene, and by 1115 hours had destroyed without incident, most of the explosives found there.²²¹ In related HUMINT reporting, 1BCT observed and reported a suspicious vehicle parked near the west gate of the Presidential Palace.²²²

Fearing a potential bomb threat, CJTF-190 dispatched the same explosives ordnance disposal (EOD) team to investigate the car, which was discovered to be "all clear."²²³ A separate HUMINT report originating at the Presidential Palace reported the discovery of several documents which potentially contained intelligence information. Based on the report, the J2, CJTF-190 dispatched a documentation exploitation (DOCEX) team comprised of IPW and Linguist personnel to the scene.²²⁴

In other HUMINT reporting, a patrol from the 1BCT observed and reported a crowd of approximately 5000 Haitians conducting a peaceful march which was moving from the US Embassy toward the Presidential Palace.²²⁵ In central PAP, a TF Raleigh soldier reported an uncontrolled street demonstration adjacent to a house owned by a FRAPH member, which resulted in the soldier dispersing the crowd, entering the FRAPH house, and seizing 16 weapons and several hundred rounds of ammunition, as well as documents and photographs.²²⁶

D+24: 13 OCTOBER 1994

Activities on 13 October 1994 got off to an early start; by twelve minutes after midnight, MP Teams were enroute to pick-up and transport Lieutenant General Cedras, Brigadier General Biamby, and their parties to the PAPIA for their imminent departure from Haiti.²²⁷ The mission was executed without incident and by 0305, two airplanes carrying all of the Cedras/Biamby parties departed Haiti.²²⁸

Although CJTF-190 forces were thoroughly engaged in security operations, planning for Mountain Strike operations continued. At approximately 0400 hours elements of 1BCT re-initiated Mountain Strike

Operations, against two suspected weapons caches: the first, a Night Club in central PAP, and the second a beach house belonging to Gerry Mourra. Like all Mountain Strike forces prior to the temporary suspension, these strike forces included CI/IPW teams and used standard cordon and search methodology. At approximately 0600 the search of the Night Club was complete, and although no weapons were discovered, the team commander elected to leave a CI Team at the site until daylight in hopes of observing or developing further information.²²⁹ The raid on Mourra's beach house did net some ammunition and a machete, but no weapons; HUMINT obtained at the site revealed that weapons had been stored there, but had been removed on the day of Mourra's detention.²³⁰

At approximately 1200 hours, elements of the 1BCT observed and reported HUMINT in the form of a SALUTE report that served to validate the need for Army wide training in that Common Task. The initial SALUTE reported an individual "planting a mine"²³¹ near the Presidential Palace. A clarifying secondary report claimed that the individual "threw a grenade" toward the Presidential Palace main gate.²³² A third report asserted that the individual was in civilian clothes, carried a FAd'H identification card, had thrown two (2) M203 rounds into a crowd and was attempting to bury a third when he was detained by a member of TF Raleigh.²³³ A final report, from Interrogators who debriefed the individual at the JDF, stated that the Haitian may have been "incorrectly identified by the crowd"²³⁴ as the person responsible for the incident at the Presidential Palace. In each instance, the elemental information remained similar: someone near the Presidential Palace had been involved with explosives, and that posed a danger to those in the vicinity. While the lack of certainty and clarity

in reporting certainly made for an uncertain environment, the initial HUMINT report did serve to highlight potential threat activity.

In further HUMINT reporting, elements of TF Mountain reported the formation of a large and unruly crowd at the National Penitentiary. Based on that report, CJTF-190 dispatched an MP platoon to the scene. Further, the information developed at the scene prompted the Commander of CJTF-190 to take interest and order a Human Rights Team to investigate.²³⁵ A second HUMINT report involving MPs concerned a Haitian civilian attempt to take over a FAd'H controlled Police Station in PAP. A CJTF-190 MP Company Commander at the scene assessed that his company was in danger, and employed a CS Gas canister to disperse the crowd of approximately 200 civilians.²³⁶

D+25: 14 OCTOBER 1994

On the day prior to the planned return of President Aristide, TF Raleigh members in Belladere observed and reported a situation in which "FAd'H soldiers were revolting against their own commander,"²³⁷ and one of the armed FAd'H threatened the US soldiers. In the altercation which followed, a TF Raleigh member shot a FAd'H member five times.

In PAP, a patrol from 1BCT discovered and reported a dead, and potentially booby-trapped body. Additionally, the patrol observed and reported a "gunman"²³⁸ standing on the fifth floor of a building in their area, although the patrol's subsequent search of the building did not produce the suspected gunman.

In a unique confluence of effort based on HUMINT reporting, a battalion commander from 1BCT observed and reported the exchange of gunfire

between Haitians in boats at the port of PAP. Further, the reporter indicated that a large crowd had formed on the shore, and requested aerial surveillance to "recon the area."²³⁹ Based on the maritime nature of the incident, a Coast Guard swift boat of the Harbor Defense Unit deployed to the scene to investigate.²⁴⁰ At the scene, members of the 503rd MP Company reported that a patrol from the 1BCT detained 8 Haitians who exited one of the boats, and seized three AK-47s and two M-14 rifles.²⁴¹ Based on the 1BCT quick response, the Coast Guard portion of the mission was subsequently cancelled. A team of International Police Monitors at the scene took responsibility for the Haitians detained by 1BCT, but not before one of the detainees told the assembled crowd that he wanted to "kill an American MP or Aristide."²⁴² The 1BCT retained control of that particular individual, whom they then transported to the JDF for further questioning.

In Cap Haitien, 2BCT executed a raid against a suspected weapons cache at approximately 1800 hours. Although the task force did detain and question one Haitian, the raid did not result in any weapons seizures.²⁴³

In further HUMINT reporting in PAP, a US Army Liaison Officer stationed at the headquarters of the FAd'H reported the formation of a crowd some 3-4000 strong adjacent to the FAd'H headquarters. A final HUMINT report on 14 October emanated from the 16th MP brigade. In that instance, a homemade bomb was discovered adjacent to the headquarters of the Haitian 22nd Police Company, and the 16th MP brigade requested EOD support to destroy the bomb.²⁴⁴

D+26: 15 OCTOBER 1994

Twenty-seven days after first landing, on the day of the much anticipated return of President Aristide, all CJTF-180 forces with security missions were on alert and in positions by 0725 hours.²⁴⁵ Including all or portions of the 1BCT, TF Mountain, the 16th MP Brigade and the 10th Aviation Brigade, the number of troops involved in providing security for President Aristide and his cabinet totaled approximately 5,417.²⁴⁶ HUMINT reports flowed in from a variety of sources in a variety of locations.

By 0745, the FAd'H liaison officer (LNO) reported that a crowd of 300-400 had formed in front of the FAd'H headquarters. By 0845, the LNO was able to observe and report that the FAd'H had reported for work, and had joined the 1BCT in establishing a security cordon around the Presidential Palace.²⁴⁷

At the PAP International Airport, a CI Team from the 1BCT observed and reported an individual distributing anti-Aristide posters in the crowd, at approximately 0840 hours.²⁴⁸ Approximately 90 minutes later, TF Mountain reported that a "bomb dog" had alerted on a package at the PAPIA terminal. Based on that report, EOD experts responded, investigated and signaled "all clear."²⁴⁹

A member of TF Raleigh reported a calm crowd of approximately 6000 formed at the Presidential Palace by 1000 hours,²⁵⁰ while a short time later a crowd of 30 to 40 Haitians began looting a business near the port. Based on this HUMINT, provided by the CARICOM battalion, CJTF-190 dispatched an MP patrol to the scene.²⁵¹

Throughout the Haitian country side, peaceful demonstrators gathered to mark the return of President Aristide. TF Raleigh provided

HUMINT reporting on peaceful demonstrations and gatherings in Les Cayes, Jacmel, Jeremie and Gonaive, and characterized the prevailing situation as "all calm."²⁵² The 2BCT, in Cap Haitien, reported large crowds gathering in the streets, but that all was "quiet."²⁵³

At the Presidential Palace, just minutes before President Aristide was to arrive, 1BCT reported an incident in which a vehicle carrying armed Haitians had attempted to gain entrance to the Presidential compound; the crowd surrounding the vehicle began to chant "FRAPH", and the vehicle departed the scene. In its final report on the subject, the 1BCT reported that the suspected FRAPH had in fact been FAd'H, correctly attempting to enter the compound.²⁵⁴

In a final significant HUMINT report on the 15 October 1994, an International Police Monitor team reported that several police stations had closed, for a 72 hour period, in anticipation of potential attacks of reprisal by the Lavalas Party.²⁵⁵ Capitalizing on that report, and the absence of the FAd'H, TF Raleigh conducted a "sweep" through the Dessaline Barracks armory and confiscated 354 weapons.²⁵⁶

In conclusion, the research revealed that HUMINT collection and reporting operations significantly contributed to the success of the critical first twenty-seven days of Operation Uphold Democracy. In addition to active participation and support in 38 Mountain Strike Operations, the apprehension of several key opposition leaders, and the production of over 300 Intelligence Information Reports, HUMINT operations served to effectively provide complete or partial answers to all of the Commander's priority intelligence requirements.

Endnotes

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⁵Military Activity, CDR's Update Briefing slide, 19 October 1994. AKN.

⁶CAP Haitian NAVFOR FORCE DISPOSITION, slide, AKN.

⁷JTF 180 FORCES, CDR's Update Briefing slide, AKN.

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⁹CDR's PIR, CDR's Update Briefing slide, AKN.

¹⁰U.S. Army, Operation Uphold Democracy Initial Impressions Volume 1 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Lessons Learned, 1994), 119.

¹¹CTF 185 Battle Watch Log, entry dated 200650Q, AKN.

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¹⁴Stability Operations, slide, AKN.

¹⁵Ibid.

¹⁶Military Personnel Assigned to Uphold Democracy, briefing slide, AKN.

¹⁷CDR's Update Briefing slide, dated 21 September 1994, AKN.

¹⁸SIGACTS, CDR's Update Briefing slide, dated 22 September 1994, AKN.

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²⁰Military Personnel Assigned to Uphold Democracy, briefing slide, AKN.

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³⁰Proposed PIR, CDR's Update Briefing slide, AKN.

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³²Military Personnel Assigned to Uphold Democracy, briefing chart.
AKN.

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³⁴Stability Operations, slide, AKN.

³⁵Cash for Guns, CJTF-180, slide, AKN.

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³⁹Ibid., 92.

⁴⁰Battle Watch Log, 250840Q, AKN.

⁴¹CJTF 180 Operational Log, 270211, AKN.

⁴²Chronology of Events Journal, 25 September 1994, AKN.

⁴³Ibid.

⁴⁴Battle Watch Log, 251105Q, AKN. ⁴⁵Ibid., 260252Q. ⁴⁶Ibid.

⁴⁷CDR's Update Briefing, slide, 25 September 1994. AKN.

⁴⁸C2W, CDR's Update Briefing slide, 25 September 1994. AKN.

⁴⁹Darryl J. Reyes, interview by author, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 13 December 1995.

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⁵²Initial Impressions, Volume II, 174.

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⁵⁴CJTF 180 Operational Log, 261640, AKN. ⁵⁵Ibid., 261729.

⁵⁶CJTF 180 Operational Log, 261915, AKN. ⁵⁷Ibid., 270706.

⁵⁸CNN, as reported in CJTF-190 Operational Log, 270908. AKN.

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⁶⁴Ibid., 271645.

⁶⁵Military Personnel Assigned to Uphold Democracy, slide. AKN.

⁶⁶CJTF-180 Operational Log, 280845. ⁶⁷Ibid., 281500.

⁶⁸Ibid., 281340. ⁶⁹Ibid., 281510.

⁷⁰CJTF-180 Significant Activity Log, 281514, AKN.

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⁷³Ibid., 282300. ⁷⁴Ibid. ⁷⁵Ibid., 290955. ⁷⁶Ibid., 291110.

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¹⁰⁶CNN, 30 September 1994.

¹⁰⁷CJTF-180 Operational Log, 301208. ¹⁰⁸Ibid., 301655.

¹⁰⁹CJTF-180 Operational Log, US Embassy Report, 301436.

¹¹⁰CJTF-180 Operational Log, 301515. ¹¹¹Ibid., 301714.

¹¹²Ibid., 302030. ¹¹³Ibid., 302353.

¹¹⁴CDR's Update Briefing slide, 30 September 1994. ¹¹⁵Ibid.

¹¹⁶10th MTN DIV, Operations in Haiti, 10-B-6. ¹¹⁷Ibid. ¹¹⁸Ibid.

¹¹⁹Reyes, interview. ¹²⁰Ibid.

¹²¹10th MTN DIV, Operations in Haiti, 10-B-6. ¹²²Ibid., 10-B-7.

¹²³U.S. Army, FM 34-60, Counterintelligence (Washington: Department of the Army, 1995), A-IV-1.

¹²⁴U.S. Army, FM 34-52, Intelligence Interrogation (Washington: Department of the Army, 1992), 3-1.

¹²⁵Initial Impressions, Volume 1, 94.

¹²⁶Initial Impressions, Volume 1, 187.

¹²⁷CJTF-180 Operational Log, 010725. ¹²⁸Ibid., 010735.

¹²⁹Ibid., 011428. ¹³⁰Ibid., 012150. ¹³¹Ibid., 011105.

¹³²CJTF-180 Operational Log, 011910. Initial estimates at the scene were "over 500 rifles and other weapons;" however, later accurate counts significantly lowered that figure, to approximately 300.

¹³³Ibid., 011937. ¹³⁴Ibid., 010925. ¹³⁵Ibid., 011053.

¹³⁶Ibid., 011425. ¹³⁷Ibid., 011441. ¹³⁸Ibid. ¹³⁹Ibid., 011710.

¹⁴⁰Reyes, interview. Interrogation of "Bobby".

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¹⁴²Working Chronology, CJTF-180 Command Historian, 2 October 1994.

¹⁴³CJTF-180 Significant Activities Log, 021551.

¹⁴⁴CJTF-180 Operational Log, 302350. ¹⁴⁵Ibid., 021700.

¹⁴⁶Ibid., 022307. ¹⁴⁷Ibid., 030159. ¹⁴⁸Ibid. ¹⁴⁹Ibid., 030222.

¹⁵⁰Ibid., 030338. ¹⁵¹Ibid., 030526.

¹⁵²CJTF-180 Significant Activity Log, 030045. ¹⁵³Ibid., 030445.

¹⁵⁴Ibid., 030810.

¹⁵⁵CJTF-180 Operational Log, 030956. ¹⁵⁶Ibid., 031022.

¹⁵⁷Ibid., 031300. ¹⁵⁸Ibid. ¹⁵⁹Ibid., 031314. ¹⁶⁰Ibid., 031640.

¹⁶¹Ibid., 031720. ¹⁶²Ibid., 041058.

¹⁶³CJTF-180 Significant Activities Log, 040914.

¹⁶⁴Ibid., 041313. ¹⁶⁵Ibid.

¹⁶⁶CJTF-180 Operational Log, 041425. ¹⁶⁷Ibid., 050544. ¹⁶⁸Ibid.

¹⁶⁹Ibid., 050538. ¹⁷⁰Ibid., 051120.

¹⁷¹CJTF-180 Significant Activities Log, 051025.

¹⁷²Ibid., 050950. ¹⁷³Ibid., 052309.

¹⁷⁴CJTF-180 Operational Log, 060356.

¹⁷⁵CJTF-180 Significant Activities Log, 060151.

¹⁷⁶Ibid., 060350. ¹⁷⁷Ibid., 060700.

¹⁷⁸CJTF-180 Operational Log, 060910.

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¹⁸⁰CJTF-180 Operational Log, 061255.

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¹⁸³Ibid., 061135. ¹⁸⁴Ibid., 061341. ¹⁸⁵Ibid., 061410.

¹⁸⁶CJTF-180 Operational Log, 070140.

¹⁸⁷CJTF-180 Significant Activities Log, 070457. ¹⁸⁸Ibid., 070511.

¹⁸⁹CJTF-180 Operational Log, 071000. ¹⁹⁰Ibid., 071320.

¹⁹¹CJTF-180 Significant Activities Log, 071205.

¹⁹²Ibid., 071211. ¹⁹³Ibid., 071545.

¹⁹⁴CJTF-180 Operational Log, 080830. ¹⁹⁵Ibid., 070520.

¹⁹⁶CJTF-180 Significant Activities Log, 080621.

¹⁹⁷Ibid., 081053. ¹⁹⁸Ibid. ¹⁹⁹Ibid., 081912. ²⁰⁰Ibid.

²⁰¹CJTF-180 Operational Log, 090900.

²⁰²CJTF-180 Significant Activities Log, 091150.

²⁰³Ibid., 091049. ²⁰⁴Ibid., 091021. ²⁰⁵Ibid., 091205.

²⁰⁶Ibid., 091510. ²⁰⁷Ibid., 091535.

²⁰⁸CJTF-180 Operational Log, 091545. ²⁰⁹Ibid., 092251.

²¹⁰CJTF-180 Significant Activities Log, 100741.

²¹¹CJTF-180 Operational Log, 101034. ²¹²Ibid., 100945.

²¹³Ibid., 101358. ²¹⁴Ibid., 102035.

²¹⁵10th MTN DIV, Operations in Haiti, 10-F-2.

²¹⁶Message Log, CJTF-190, 102230OCT94. AKN.

²¹⁷CJTF-180, Commanders Update Briefing slide, 11 October 1994.

²¹⁸Ibid.

²¹⁹CJTF-180 Operational Log, 112001.

²²⁰CJTF-180 Significant Activities Log, 12100. ²²¹Ibid., 121115.

²²²Ibid., 121111. ²²³Ibid., 121124. ²²⁴Ibid., 121000.

²²⁵Ibid., 121657. ²²⁶Ibid., 122000. ²²⁷Ibid., 130012.

²²⁸CJTF-180 Operational Log, 130305.

²²⁹CJTF-180 Significant Activities Log, 130556.

²³⁰CJTF-180 Operational Log, 131124.

²³¹CJTF-180 Significant Activities Log, 131245.

²³²Initial Impressions, VOL 1, 109.

²³³CJTF-180 Operational Log, 132228. ²³⁴Ibid., 132233.

²³⁵CJTF-180 Significant Activities Log, 131730.

²³⁶CJTF-180 Operational Log, 131514. ²³⁷Ibid., 140643.

²³⁸CJTF-180 Significant Activities Log, 140745. ²³⁹Ibid., 141320.

²⁴⁰Ibid., 141414. ²⁴¹Ibid., 141419. ²⁴²Ibid., 141445.

²⁴³Ibid., 141805. ²⁴⁴Ibid., 142340.

²⁴⁵CJTF-180 Operational Log, 150725. ²⁴⁶Ibid., 141535.

²⁴⁷Ibid., 150845. ²⁴⁸Ibid., 150918.

²⁴⁹CJTF-180 Significant Activities Log, 151026.

²⁵⁰CJTF-180 Operational Log, 151006.

²⁵¹CJTF-180 Significant Activities Log, 151052.

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²⁵⁵CJTF-180 Significant Activities Log, 151400. ²⁵⁶Ibid., 151500.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The historical data supported a determination that HUMINT is best defined as a category of intelligence that describes all information collected from, and methods of information collection conducted by, humans. While that definition opened the door to consideration of disparate HUMINT sources, running the gamut from concerned citizens to dedicated military intelligence organizations, the historical record clearly accentuated the HUMINT ability of uniformed soldiers. Further, a categorization of HUMINT by its association to the recognized levels of war¹ served to clarify how HUMINT supported Commanders at those levels; but, the real lines between strategic, operational, and tactical HUMINT blurred in the context of an historical definition of HUMINT which relied upon, "most importantly, reports from friendly troops."²

With HUMINT thus defined, a review of the HUMINT capable forces that supported CJTF-180 included both military and nonmilitary assets. Among the military forces were specific military intelligence units, including the 525th MI Brigade, the 110th MI Battalion, and the MI Detachment of the 3rd Special Forces Group, each of which conducted CI and IPW operations. The preponderance of HUMINT, however, was collected and reported by non-military intelligence elements of CJTF-180, the most significant of which were the 1st and 2nd Brigades of the 10th Mountain Division, TF Mountain and TF Raleigh. Non-military units included US

citizens and Haitian citizens, as well as the omnipresent CNN; these HUMINT sources provided timely, accurate information that supported the mission of CJTF-180.

The actual management and employment of HUMINT in Operation Uphold Democracy compared favorably with the requirements of doctrine. Where divergence from doctrine occurred, the effect was positive, and served to capitalize on the ability of an individual to engage the local populace, and through observation and discussion acquire accurate information to both conduct successful operations and satisfy the commander's PIR.

A review of the operational activities during the first twenty-seven days of Operation Uphold Democracy, as recounted in the operational logs, message traffic and after action reviews of the participants, revealed that HUMINT supported successful operations throughout Haiti. Among the significant activities supported by HUMINT were: 38 Mountain Strike Operations, which netted detainees, weapons, drugs and counterfeit money at 23 different locations;³ the location and detention of key active political opponents of the Aristide government, including Gerry Mourra and others;⁴ and the conduct of CI screening and IPW debriefing of over 100 detainees at the JDF, which resulted in the production of over 300 IIRs and Spot Reports. While these three areas serve to highlight HUMINT support during OUD, the research revealed that HUMINT was a significant form of routine information collection and reporting throughout the twenty-seven day period.

In sum, HUMINT was an integral aspect of the overall intelligence effort that supported Operation Uphold Democracy during its first twenty-seven days, a period in which the focus of CJTF-180 was on securing and

stabilizing the country of Haiti in preparation for President Aristide's return on 15 October 94. The primary and secondary questions which framed the scope of this research project, however, required a determination of whether that HUMINT support was effective. As defined by the research model, effective was a determination made based on whether HUMINT collectors were *tasked*, whether those collectors *reported*, and finally, whether the information reported answered the commander's *PIR*. The research indicated that HUMINT capable collectors were tasked, as indicated in CJTF-190 Collection Plan as well as the nightly HUMINT coordination meetings hosted by the 519th MI BN. Further, the research indicated that HUMINT was collected and reported, as evidenced by the voluminous instances of HUMINT reporting detailed in the twenty-seven day narrative and the more than 300 IIRs produced during that period. Finally, the research indicated that HUMINT provided answers to all of the Commander's *PIR*, including determining the threat to U.S. forces, identifying key opposition leaders, and determining the disposition of key FAd'H units. In sum, HUMINT was effective in support of Operation Uphold Democracy.

In evaluating whether HUMINT collectors were tasked, CJTF-190's Collection Plan served as official recognition of the HUMINT collection capabilities of its various units. This recognition complimented an historical determination of the definition of HUMINT; one which resolved that HUMINT is derived from both pro-active MI Corps collectors, and specifically tasked non-MI Corps units. A 519th MI Battalion initiative--the HUMINT coordination meeting--echoed that understanding of the HUMINT capabilities within CJTF-190, but elevated the process one level in its

successful attempt to formally centralize and synchronize the capabilities of a myriad of HUMINT collection sources.

In evaluating whether HUMINT was reported, the record of operations over the twenty-seven day period reflects that HUMINT was reported from specifically tasked MI and non-MI units, from un-tasked military units and other official sources, as well as from unsolicited civilian sources.

While the research did reflect that HUMINT was a primary source of information reporting, it also pointed out the inherent fallibility of humans in accurately describing observed events. In that regard, the research highlighted the need for continued training in the common soldiers task of submitting an accurate SALUTE report.

Throughout the twenty-seven day period, HUMINT information provided the answers to many of the commander's PIR. HUMINT detailed the location of weapons caches and individuals wanted for questioning by CJTF-180; HUMINT was the source of information on individuals and groups at cross-purposes to CJTF-180 and the democratically elected government of Haiti; and, HUMINT was the source of a wealth of information related to the protection of US forces in the area of operations.

The research also spawned two ideas for further research. First, what are the long range implications of the formation of the Defense HUMINT Service? The DHS was designed to eliminate intra-service redundancy in the HUMINT arena. By removing specific HUMINT collection assets from the control of the various Services, DHS sought to provide a better service to the regional Commanders-in-Chief (CINCs). Although the DHS deployed a team to OUD, the 519th was unaware of its existence. Second, the research raised the question of whether the Intelligence and Reconnaissance Platoon

(1935-1965) was discontinued, or was it effectively replaced by the development of the MI CEWI battalion? The historical review of the development of HUMINT indicated that intelligence and maneuver units have been indelibly linked since time immemorial. The most recent reorganization of the tactical MI battalion, which places a DS company under the control of each brigade commander, seems to continue that traditional linkage.

Finally, the TTP discovered in the research, such as the use of the HUMINT coordination meeting, the inclusion of CI/IPW Teams in operational missions, and the specific reliance upon HUMINT in the D3A process in an OOTW environment, provide lessons for all future military operations. Each and every one of these TTP were instrumental in the overall conduct of OUD, and in the context of HUMINT's utility, assured that HUMINT was effective in support of Operation Uphold Democracy.

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²U.S. Army, FM 34-1, Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations (Washington: Department of the Army, 1994), 2-12.

³10th MTN DIV, Operations in Haiti, 10-b-6.

⁴Ibid., 10-F-4.

APPENDIX

JTF-180 TASK ORGANIZATION (AS OF 9 OCT 94)

CJTF-180 CONTROL

HQ, XVIII AIRBORNE CORPS
ASSAULT CP
MAIN CP
REAR CP
JOINT INFORMATION BUREAU
JOINT RESCUE COORDINATION CENTER

TF 190 (10TH MOUNTAIN DIVISION)

HQ, 10TH MOUNTAIN DIVISION
HQ, 1ST BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM
1-22 INFANTRY
1-87 INFANTRY
HQ, 2ND BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM
3-14 INFANTRY
TM STRIKE (B/3-15 INFANTRY)
2-87 INFANTRY
TASK FORCE MOUNTAIN
2-22 INFANTRY
2-14 INFANTRY
10TH AVIATION BRIGADE (-)
10TH INFANTRY DIVISION ARTILLERY (-)
10TH INFANTRY DIVISION DISCOM (-)
10TH FORWARD SUPPORT BATTALION (-)
10TH MILITARY POLICE BATTALION

10TH MP COMPANY
62ND MP COMPANY (CID)
511TH MP COMPANY
TASK FORCE RALEIGH (BLACK) (2-3SFG)

1ST COSCOM (-)
16TH MP BRIGADE (-)
18TH AVIATION BRIGADE (-)
525TH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BRIGADE (-)
20TH ENGINEER BRIGADE (-)
35TH SIGNAL BRIGADE (-)
44TH MEDICAL BRIGADE (-)

TASK FORCE 185 (NAVFOR)

CTG 185.0 (COMNAVFOR)
CTG 185.1 (COMDESRON)
CTG 185.2 (SPMAGTF CARIBBEAN)

2ND MARINES
BLT 2/2
HMM 264
CSSD-29
CTG 185.3 (E-2C)
CTG 185.4 (E-2C)
TASK FORCE 186 (AFFOR)
12TH AIR FORCE (-)
JOINT TASK FORCE 188 (JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS TASK FORCE)
JOINT TASK FORCE 180.1 (JOINT PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS TASK FORCE)

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
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
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